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ABSTRACT
Changing Patterns of Juvenile Justice in District One
Juvenile C o urt, Utah , as Affected by the 1967
U . S. Supreme Court Decision on Gault
by
Ruth V. Mickelson, Master of Science
Utah State University, 1970
Major Professor: Nile Meservy
Department: Sociology
A determination was made of the degree to which the fou r requirements of Gault were met in District I of the Utah Juvenile Court between
July l , 1967 and June 30, 1969. The requirements handed down in 1967
by the U. S. Supreme Court were as follows:

(a) guarantee to the right

of notice given to the juvenile himself and to his parents; (b) right to
counse l , representation by counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings;
(c) right to confrontation and cross-examination by prosecu ting witness;
and (d) privilege against self- incrimination in juvenile delinquency
proceedings.
Observable procedures indicate that sustained effort is being made
by District I, Utah, toward affording protection of basic lega l r ight s to
juvenile court clients and their families .

However, the juvenile court

records, as the source of information for this study, show the four

vii

requirements of Gault as being met only in part during the period of time
specified. It wa s also found that, w ith only two changes, the Utah Juv en!le Court Act of 1965 would have already been fulfill ing , in Utah, t he
req uirements provided by the subsequent 1967 U. S . Supreme Court dec i sion on Gault.

These two recommended changes w e re, first , a pro-

vis i on requiring that it be recorded whether or not the chiid was notified
of h i s rights; and second, that a provision be added to record the name
of the complainant, his presence , and if his testimony was used during
the proceeding .
(117 pages)
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The juvenile c ou rt , according to Ellett (1940 - 1942) , should be
guardian not penal in nature.

No thing the child says can incriminate

him becat:se his welfare i s the object of the court . To socialize the
child means to extract the who le truth about the circumstances and to
cooperate with the child in inding the best solution to his problem.

The

juvenile court aims at treating the wayward child in a way that he may
become a useful citizen in the future.
The State of Utah Biennial Report o f the Secretary of the Juvenile
Court and Probation Commis s io n (1940 - 1942) discusses the foundations
of t he juvenile c ourt :
It is [jllsQJ pred1cated upon a philosophy that crime in its
larger sense is not of spontaneous o rigin but is the outgrowth of
a developmental precess which had its foundation sprin gs in
childhood a nd youth . The juvenile court is als o buil t upon the
theory that the ind ividual is the product of his accumulated ex periences plus hereditary endowment; in other words, the
criminal 1s not born but is made . (State of Utah Biennial Report
of the Secretary of the Juvenile Court and Probation Commission,
1940 - 1942 , p . ll)
It is the purpose of the c ourt only to step into a case when other
fo rces have failed t o res ult in success. When the court does step in , it
does not replace other ag e ncies . Instead, it views the child's relati.ons h1p to society and then tries to redirect the forces necessary to correct
any anti-social behavior of the child .

The Committee on the Standard Juvenile Court Act of the National
Council on Cnme and Delinquency in Cooperation with the National
Council of Juvenile Court Judges and the U . S . Children's Bureau
(19 59, p . 9) stated "the well-e stablished fundamental purpose of the
c o urts dealing w ith chi.ldren is to protect them and re sto re th e m to society
as la w -a biding citizen s.
In 196 7, the U . S . Supreme Court handed down what is known as
the Gault decision designed to further establish the welfare of the juvenile . It is the purpo se of this study to determine to what degree the
requirements of this Supreme Court decision are being met in District I ,
Utah .

Dist.rict I includes Cache, Box Elder, and Weber counties.
In 1965, the State of Utah passed a juvenile court law. It is also

the purpose of this study to determine if this Utah Act established
guarantees to juveniles which fulfilled, with only two changes , thos e
guarantees provided in the 1967 Supreme Court Decision . These two
changes w ill be discussed at s c me length later in this thesis .

Definition of Terms

So me lega l terms and phrases are used in the text of this study .
To provide a better understanding of the text, t hese words and phrases
will now be defined .

Adi udicatory hearing
The second of three stages of a juvenile court hearing .

(The first

stage is a jurisdictional stage to determine if a petition should be filed .
The third is the sentencing proc ess or dispositional stage.) The adjudicatory stage
constitutes the determination of whether the petition
or other formal procedure authorized at the conclusion of the first
stage is supported by facts and whether those facts correspond
to the jurisdictional ground asserted in the pleading. (George,
l968b ' p . 42)

Advocate
One t hat defends and pleads the cause of another .

According to Lou (192 7) , chancery is welfare or balancing of in t.eres t s . The court of chancery assumes the duties which parents are
unable or unwilling to _ulfi ll .

"Holding a child, usu ally prior to trial, in close physical custody
in a spec ia l j uvenile detention center" (Cavan, 1962, p . 238) .

Webster defines the la w of equity as :
The system of law wh ich originated in the extraordinary
justice fo rmerly admi nistered by the king' s chancellor and was
later developed into a body of rul es supplementary to or aiding
the common a nd statute law . The term has come t o designate
the form al system of l ega l and procedural rules and doctrines
a c c ording to which jus ti ce is administered within certain limits
of jurisdiction . (W e bster, 1963, p . 28 1)
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Esteem
"The evaluation of an individual's role behavior in a given status;
the judgment of his fellows of how well he fulfills the expectatlons of
his role

(Socio logy 5, no date, p . 3).

Ex-officio co mmission
A commission created by virtue of an office already held by me mber s
of t he commission,

Habeas

cor~

A writ for inquiring into the lawful ness of the restraint of a
person who is imprisoned or detained in another's custody" (Webster,
1963, p. 373) .

. Incorporated municipality
Web ster (1963 , p . 557) states that a municipality is a "town , city,
or other district having powers of local self- government." Incorporated
is defined by W ebster (1963 , p . 423) as "united in one body."

Judicial district
A certain area held accountable for administrative responsibility .

Juvenile delinquency
Cavan {1962, p . 15) gives a nonlegal definition of juvenile
delinquency : " . . . the failure of children and youth to meet certain
obligations expect ed of the m by the so ciety in which th ey live ."

Good (1945, p . 23) also gives a nonlegal definition :

. . any child or

you th whose conduct. devi ates sufficiently from normal social usage to
warrant his being considered a menace to himself, to hi s future interests,
or to socie ty itself."
thority ,

No nlegal definitions vary from authority to a u-

For the purpose of this study, the legal definition used by the

United States Children ' s

Bureau will apply here .

Cavan, in her book ,

quotes from the Bneau as follo ws:
Juvenile delinquency cases are those referred to courts for
acts defined in the statutes of the State as the violation of law
o r municipal ordinance by children or youth of juvenile court age
or for conduct so seriously anti social as to in t erfere with the
rights of others or to menace the welfare of the delinquency himself or of the community. (Cavan, 1962, p . 15)

Parens patriae
The crown or king of a country assuming the role of a father or
guardian (Lou, 1927) .

Partisans
Followers .

" Supervision of a delinquent child after the court hearing but with out commitment to a trainin g school" (Cavan, 1962, p . 238).

Sovereign
Highest in power or position.
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A definition of status, which is used in Interm ed i ate Sociology ,
Sociology 170, at Utah State University, is as follows :
. . . the relative position, rank, or standing of a person in
the group . []tatui} designates a position in the gene ral i nstitutional system, re cognized and su ppo rted by the entire socie ty,
spontaneou sl y evolved rather than deliberately created and rooted
m the folkways and mores . (Sociology 170, no d ate , p. 20)

Defin ing the Schedule

Questions one through five on the schedule are self-explanatory
and will n ot be dealt with in this chapter (see Appendix for sc hedule ).
Item 6 .

Parent-child or parent substitute-child relatio nship a t the

time of comm i tment .
11

Responses s ho wn h e re were "inadequate" or

adequat e . "

Parent - child or parent substitute- child relationship wa s felt, by this
writer , to be " adequate" on the followin g basis: (a) consistent, reasonable discipline adm!nistered by parents and understood by juvenile;
(b) understanding , on the part of the parents, o f the juvenile's pro blems ;
(c) accept ance of the juvenile by his parents; (d) des ire by the parents to
help th e child duri ng thi s period; (e) e qual attention given by parents to
juvenile and other siblings; and (f) acceptance by the juve nile of limits
set by his parents . If the writer felt , after readin g the social histo ry
o f the child, that these guidelines were being met in th e home, then an
"adequate" relatio nship was recorded . If most of these requireme nts
were missing , then an " inadeq uate" relations hip was recorded . In
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many instances, the probation officer used the word "adequa te " or
'· madequate" in de s cribing the parent-child relationship .
Item 7 .

Physical

l ~ vl ng

condit ions at the time o f comm itment were

also de fln ed as "adequa e " and " i nadequate ." "Adequate" li'.Ting con ditions were included if the following were present:

(a) adequate sleep-

ing and living quarters for the number o f family memb ers ,

(b) cleanliness

of the ho use and yard, (c) o ther adequate facilities s u ch as furniture .
" Inadequate" refers to physical living conditions which do not meet these
criteria ,

Items 8 through 25 were answered directly from the fact shee t in the
social hi story or from papers contained in the legal record .

Orig in and Nature of Problem

Relevant literature appears to indicate that the guarantees of the
due process of l aw, prior tc the U. S . Supreme Court decision on Gault
in 19 6 7 , were denied t o Juv eniles in many instances .
In this study, the case in question is that of Gerald Francis Gault,
age 15 . George (l9 68b) descri bes the case : Gerald and a friend were
picked up by po lice in Arizona after a complai.nt wa s made on them by a
neighboring lady .

During the process of being convicted, Gerald wa s

den i ed six constitutio nal rights:

(a) guarantee to the right of notice

given to the juvenile himself and to h is parents ; (b) right t o counsel,
representation by counsel in juvenile delinquenc y proceeding s; (c) nght
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to confrontation and cross-exammation by prosecuting witnesses; and
(d) privil ege against self-incrimination in juvenile delinquency proceedings.

The Gault case was later taken to the U . S . Supreme Court.

The

Supreme Court ' s decision on Gau lt resulted in the above four guarantees
to juveniles.

The following two rights were not upheld in the U. S.

Supreme Court decision :

(d) the right to a transcript of the proceedings,

and (f) the right to appellate review.
The landmark U. S. Supreme Court decision on Gault sets down the
guarantees of ; (a) guarantee to the right to notice given to the juvenile
himself and to his parents;

(b) right to counsel, representation by counsel

in juvenile delinquency proceedings; (c) right to confrontation and crossexamination by prosecuting witnesses; and (d) privilege against selfincrimination in juvenile delinquency proceedings.
As stated by George (l968b , p . 15) , "the Gault case . . . is the
first in a series of legal battles in which due process requirements will
be expanded far beyond what has been thought to be their constitutiona l
limits. "
These new requirements must be met in each of the juvenile courts.
This means a complete revision in most of our courts .

However , in 1965

Utah passed a juvenile court law including provisions for protection of
legal rights for the juvenile . It is assumed, by this writer, that the
1965 Utah Juvenile Court law would fulfill, with two changes, therequirements listed above as set down in the Gauit decision.

The two

recommended changes are : first , a provision requiring that it be recorded

whether or not the child was notified of his rights to protect against selfincnmination, and second , that a provision be added to record the name
of the complainant, his presence, and if his testimony is used during the
proceeding .

Thus , the 1965 Utah Juvenile Court Law , with the above

two recommended changes , would already have fulfilled the four require ments of Gault; namely , notice , counsel , confrontation , and crossexamination.

If these two changes are justified, then Utah ' s District I

would seem to have fulfilled the above four requirements.
One aim of this study is to determine to what degree the four requirements set down by the U. S. Supreme Court decision on Gault are
being met in District I , Utah , as indicated by the juvenile court records
of this district.

District I is comprised of three Northern Utah counties:

Cache , Box Elder, and Weber .

The period covered in this study is from

July 1 , 1967, to June 30 , 1969. It will be determined whether or not the
following requirements were met during this time : (a) guarantee to the
right of notice given to the juvenile himself and to his parents; (b) right
to counsel, representation by counsel in juvenile delinquency proceeding s; (c) right to confrontation and cross-examination by prosecuting
witnesse s; and (d) privilege against self -in crimination in juvenile delinquency proceedings.
A second objective of this study is to see if the 1965 Utah Juvenile
Court Law will fulfill, with only two changes, the guarantees set down in
the U. S . Supreme Court decision on Gault.

These two recommended

changes are : first , a provision requiring that it be recorded whether or
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not the juvenile was not ified o f his rights to protect him against selfincr iminatio n , and secon d , that a prov ision be adde d to re c o rd t he name
of the compla inant and if he is pre sent and his testimony used d uring the
j uve nile court proc e e ding .
A third aim of this study is to learn about the factors of age, race,
a nd s ex o the juveniles invol ved in this sample . It i s hoped that this
i n fo rmation will prov ide the writer with knowledge rele v ant to characteristics of juveniles committed to a state industrial institution .
A fourth aim is to become familiar with the family background of the
juv enile by looking at his living arrangement at the time of commitment,
t he parent-c hild or parent substitute-child relationship at the time of
commitment, the phys ica l livi ng conditions of the juvenile, parent employme nt , numbe r of s i blings, and natural parents' marital status at the
tim e of commitm e n t.
The in fo rmation re garding the third and fourth aim s of this study will
b e i nc luded i n the Appen dix ins te ad of the text.

The writer feels this in-

fo rmation is not nece s sar ily relevant to the Gault decision, but could be
us e ful for oth e r juvenile c ou rt s tudies .

Method and Procedure

Permission was o btained from Mr. Joseph Tite, Director of Probation
i n District I, Utah, t o us e the juvenile court records from Cache, Box
Elder, and Weber counties . Fifty-nine cases were used from these three
c ounties .

This is the tota l number of cases resulting in commitment to a
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state juvenile institution durin g the period of July l , 1967, to June 30,
1969 .

Commitments were made only to t he Uta h State Industrial School

at Ogden, Utah , and the Youth Unit of the State Hospital at Provo , Utah .
A pre-test was adm inistered in the Logan City court to see if the
sch e d ule was adequate and if adequate informa tion was available from
the records . After this pre-test, changes were made to gain the necessary
information, and the schedu l e was then administered to the enti re district.
After tallying the responses to each question , a separate table was
arrang ed to score, on a percentage basis, the responses to each question.
Through this percentage system, it will be determined to what degree the
four objectives , stated above , were met.
Within the context of this thesis , the basic study , as described
unde r this heading of Method and Proced ure , is prefaced in some detail
by J u venile Court and Gault Case historical background material to offer
the greatest possible clarification and strength to the study .
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CHAPTER II
HISTORY OF THE JUVENILE COURT

Origin in the United States

Comments on the historical background of the juvenile court move ment in the United States are necessary for a better understanding of the
philosophies and principles behind the court system as it stands today.
The juvenile court is of recent origin, particularly in the United
States .

However, many authors, including Lou (19 2 7), Robison (19 63),

Grunhut (1956), Mack (1925), Hurley (1925), Cavan (1962), and
Cadbury (1938) , have traced th e legal principles underlying the movement
from fa r back into legal history.
From the work of the above authors, two main schools of thought
have evol ved concerning the origin of the juvenile court movement:
first , the idea of chancery o r equity , and second the English Common
Law theory.

A distinction between these two ideas is made below.

Chancery
Robinson (1932c) reported that the sovereign during the old courts
of equity was the ultimate parent of all minors who required care and
protection . The crown was parens patriae or final parent authority.
power was exercised through the chancellor.

Its
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The court of chancery assumes duties which parents are unable or
unwilling to fulfill.

Lou s tates :

The essential idea of chancery is welfare or balancing of
interests . It stands for flexibility, guardianship, and protection rather than rigidity and punishment. The common-la w
doctrine that the crown is pare_ns patriae, father of his country,
is but the medieva l way of expressing what we mean today
when we say that the state is the guardian of social interests .
{Lou, 1927, p . 4)
The principle of individual prevention is important to chancery . It
is the respcnsibility of the state to see that the child's treatment prevents him from further wrong-doing .

However, according to Grunhut,

. . . in the juvenile court this preven tive purpose implies more
than the mere negative aim of making him avoid further criminal
activities. Rather are its efforts directed to the positive end
of giving the young delinquent a better start in life . . . .
{Grunhut , 1955, p . l-2)

'

These aims cannot be achiev ed only through legal precepts ; they require
discretion on the part of the administrator .
According to Robison, the arguments, that the juvenile court is
primarily of chancery origin , are as follows:
1 . The juvenile court embodies the concept of welfare or
balancing of interests . •. .
2. Along with English common law, chancery jurisdiction
and procedure were transplanted to America. In the English common law, the Crown is the parens patriae, the father of the
country. In its modern equivalent, the state is the guardian of
the social interests of the child and thus the ultimate parent.
Sovereign states ha ve assumed prerogatives and obligations of
the Crown and still continue to enlarge their summary jurisdiction for the protect ion and care of the individuals abnormal in
person . . . . Following this line of reasoning , the juvenile court
laws in the United States may be regarded as a logi cal extension
of the princi ples of chancery in guardianship in the English court
of neglected and destitute children to cover delinquent behavior
as well. (Robison, 1953, p . 232)
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Other writer s on the juvenile court accept the chance ry origi n of th e
court only as it applies to the neglected, d ependent, or destitute child .
They prefer to trace the application of the juvenile court's juris diction
o ver delinquency to criminal law rather than to an e xtension of the principle of chancery .

English c o mmon law
Robison (1 963, p. 232) reported that those , who agree with the
common law principle of criminal responsibility, are referring to the
English common law whic h state s that " . . . no person can be guilty of
a crime unless he acted with a guilty mind.

A child unde r the age of 7

is considered incapable of felonious intent .
Cavan in regards to English common law points ou t :
. . . children could be held respons ible if it could be shown that
they were sufficiently intelligent to understand the nature and consequences of their misdeeds and if they could di stingu is h between
right and wrong . Such children could be subjecte d to the same
c riminal type of tria l and punishment a s adult c rimina l s , even to
infliction o f the death penalty in extrem e cases . (Cavan, 1962 ,
p . 234)
This l aw, which was in Section 7915 of the Compiled Law s of Utah
in 1917, held that no child betwee n the ages of 7 and 14 should be con victed of a crime w ithout clear proof that he knew the wro n gfulness of the
act at the time he committed th e crim e .
Lou (1927 ) indicated that a new way of dealing with delinquent
child ren wa s neede d to replace the o ld chancery court's j urisdiction over
dependent chil dren .

This, he felt , was the reasoning b e h ind the departure
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fro m the courts of chanc ery ,
As Ro bison stated:
Lou conc lud es that the juvenile c ourt procedure has traces
of b oth chancery and criminal law origin and that its logical
justification is the recognition that the older criminal courts did
n o t succeed in preventing crim e, In c on trast, the juvenile court,
c on cerned with ca re and rehabilitation, attempts to replace the
punitive and retributive attitude prevailing in courts of mo re
g e ne ra l jurisdi ctio n , (Ro bis on , 1963 , p , 232)
Flex n er and Oppenhe i me r (1922) concluded that rega rdless of the
c onfli cting view s h e ld by writers as to the origin , the prin c iples underlying the movement were n ot new but were applied from the earlier courts
of chancery , therefore , being a n outgrowth rather than a departure from
legal theory,
Ca v an (1962) stre ssed that the two forces , chancery and English
common law , were merged ,

From this merger came the concept that

c hildren under a ce rtain age are not responsible for criminal acts and that
s ome c hildre n are in the nee d of p rotection by the courts ,

Illinois I uvenile Court Law
The fi rs t juv enile court did not formally develop until 18 99.

How-

ever , attempts were made, before this time, to remove children from
cri minal courts and to s o ften " the harshness of the laws" (Lou, 1927,
p

0

134).
The Illinois J t:venile Court Law was originated because of this deep

concern o ver children for wh o m no appropriate institutional care was
available ,

This law wa s no t new in and of itself.

Lou (1927) ·reported

16

tha t the only new concept was that the child, who broke the law, was not
to be regarded as a criminal,

The law was passed to regulate the treat-

ment and control of children .
Provisions of the Illinois Juvenile Court Law, according to Cadbury,
were as follows :
1. For the separate hearing of children's cases in a court
having chancery rather than criminal jurisdiction.
2 . For the detention of children apart from adult offenders.
3 . For a probation system. (Cadbury, 1938, p. 72)
Other beneficial results of the Illinois Juvenile Court Law are
pointed out by Bloch and Flynn who state,
. . . that the act eliminated arrests of children by warrants, the
use of indictment, and virtually all other features of crimina l proceedings, and it provided a separate juvenile courtroom, separate
records , and informal procedures . (Bloch and Flynn , 19 56, p. 311)
The aim of the state , according to Hurley (192 S, p . 320), "

is

primarily to adjust the differences existing between its citizens and to
provide for the wants and nece s si ties of its dependents . " Before the
Illinois Juvenile Court Law was passed, the state appeared to be neglecting its duty.

Summary
Two main schools of thought exist on the origin and development of
principles behind the juvenile court movement in the United States.
First is the idea of chancery .

Chancery "stands for flexibility,

guardianship , and protection rather than rigidity and punishment" (Lou,
1927 , p. 4).
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The second is the English common law system which stated that no
chlld unde r sev en was capable of committing a crime . If a child was cons 1dered capable of committing a c r ime, then he was t o be tri e d t:nder the
cri min a 1 law .
The Illinois Juvenile Court Law wa s originated because of concern
for the care of children .

Its foundations evolved from a combination of

principles basic to both the law of chancery and the English common law .

History of the Utah Juvenile Court

The spread of the j uvenile court movement has been tremendous and
extended into mo st parts of the world.

Every year new laws have been

passed giving more freedom and power to the juvenile courts .

There were

n o traditions in the adm inistrational en d of the movement; therefore, new
pro cedures had to be developed .

Through experience and testing , stand -

ard techniques have been formulated .

The juvenile court movement, ac -

c ording to Ro bin sen (1936-1938), spread rapidly because it was protecting
severe penalties against the child . The new law would be a protection
fe r the child .
During this time, Lou (1927) tells that many other state s passed
similar laws, thus making the pioneering state of development for the juvenile court la s ting until about 1904 .
According to Hurley , some of these states were as follows :
Wisconsin Juvenile Court, March 26 , 1901; Buffalo Juvenile Court ,
May l, 1901 ; New York Juvenile Court, January 1 , 1902;
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Maryland Juvenile Court , june 1 , 1902; Ohio juvenile Court,
April 18, 1902; Ind iana Juvenile Court, 1903; and Denver juvenile Court, 1903. (Hurley , 1925, p . 329)
This was still a time when the courts were in experimental stages
and administration had many weak points.

Many methods were tried

and each one was an improvement upon the other.
Utah was also involved in the pioneering stage of the development
of the United States juvenile court system.

A detailed discussion of

Utah's juvenile court history will show the movement toward progressive
legislation and an up-to-date system.

Early legislation
According to Ziegler (1969, p. 1), Utah was developing methods of
treatment for juveniles even before the Illinois juvenile Court Law of
1899. ln 18 52, a law was enacted by Utah legislature " . . . whereby a
child could be removed from his home with or without his parent's consent and bound out to other persons." A territorial reform school was
established in 1888 .

"In 1894 children, who were beyond parental con -

trol because of 'incorrigibility' or 'vicious conduct,' were made subject
to the district court ' s jurisdiction for possible commitment to the ter ritorial reform school . " And in 1898, negl ected and vagrant children
could be placed in a "paternal school" by the court .
Application of the juvenile court movement in Utah, as reviewed by
Robinson (l932a), dates back to 1905 when the l egis l ature enacted a law
permitting l arger cities to establish juvenile courts as a branch of the
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city court system . A city JUvenile court c ommission was set up to
o rganize these courts .

The comm i ssi on consisted of the mayor , school

superintendent , and chief o f po lice .
The 1905 Act , approv ed Marc h 16 , 1905 , is de sc ribed by Ro b inson
as fo llows :
An act provi ding for Juve n 'l e Courts , provi d ing fo r the appointment of probatio n officers, o utlining their duties and specifying their compensation; providing a method of proce d ure
against juvenile delinquents, specifying places for then tem po rary and permanent detention , and the compensation for their
care ; providing for the time and place of trial ; defining delinquent child and delinquent person; providing punishment for
all delinquents . (Robins on, 19 32a , p . 6)
In 1907 , the Juvenile Court Commission, which then consisted of
the governor, the state superintendent o f publi.c instruction , and the attorney general, had the powers to establish juvenile courts in larger
cities o f the state, according to Ellett (1940-1942).
the state ' s expense .

This was done at

Before this time , the expense was paid by the city

administration, and the c ou rt ' s jurisdiction was limited to the cit1es in
which they had been originated ,

The 1907 legislature , according to

Winter s (1964-1965), also set up a Juvenile Court and Probation Com mission on a statewide basis .

This commission l asted until 1941.

Utah J uvenile Court Commi.ssion
Ellett (1940-1942) reported that a separate juvenile court in each
judicial district was set up in 1909 and was completely different from the
district courts.

From the Minutes of the Meetings of the Juvenile Court
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Commission (1909) it can be found that in 1909 a detention home for girls
was also established .
In 1910, at the meeting of the Juvenile Court Commission, a discussion too

place regarding the lack of uniformity of the list of o ffenses

for bringing in a delinquent child.

Because of this irregularity , they de-

cided to lis t offenses under three main head ings : (a) offenses against
s o ciety, (b) offenses against the person, and (c) offenses against
propeny .

This wa s done to help save the child from being "tagged" or

"branded" a criminal for his acts .
The year 1913, according to Ellett (1940-1942) , saw the juvenile
courts of each of the 10 JUdicial districts being staffed by one judge and
a chief probation officer with powers to appoint additio na l probation officers . This sys tem continued until 1931 .
" The establishment of juvenile courts in Utah is authorized under
Section 1814, Chapter 9 of the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917" (National
Pro bation and Parole Ass o ciatio n, 1929, p . 6).
At the meeting of the Juvenile Coun Commission (December 18 ,
1926). Section 1814 of the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, was d is cussed in reference t o the use of jails and prisons for detention rooms
for juveniles :
In any and every incorporated municipality , children under
the age of sixteen y e ars , who are brought before any court of
summary jurisdictio n for examination, under any of the provisions
of this chapter, shall not be fo re trial or examination be confined
i n the jails , lock-ups, or police cells used for ordinary criminals
or persons charged wi th crime , nor , save as hereinafter mentioned,
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shall children be tried or have their cases disposed of in the
police court ordinarily used as such. It shall be the duty of
such municipalities to make separate provisions for the custody
and detention of each child prior to their trial or detention examination, whether by arrangement with some member of the
police force or other person or society who may be willing to
undertake the responsibility o f such temporary custody or de tention on such terms as may be agreed upon, or by providing
suitable premises entirely distinct and separate from the ordinary jails , lock-ups or police cel ls , and it shall be the duty of
the court to try all such children or examine into their cases
and dispose of them where practicable, in premises other than
the ordinary police court premises, or, where this is not prac ticable, in a private office of the court, if practicable, then in
the ordinary police court room, but on ly in such last mentioned
case when an interval of two hours shall have e l apsed after the
criminal trials or other examinations for the day have been dis posed of . . .
(Minutes of the Meetings of the Juvenile Court
Commiss i on, 1907-1939, p. 139)
As can be seen from the above law, it then was the practice to
protect the juvenile from any association with crimina l courts, prisons,
or the criminals themselves.
It can be found, according to Ellett (1940-1942), that the Utah Ju-

venile Court Commission in 1928 initiated a survey of its courts because
of the lack of improvement in the system.

The commission then o btained

the services of the National Probation and Parole As soc i ation to conduct
the survey.

Nationa l Probation and Parole Association
The purpose of the Utah survey, as given by the Field Secretary,
Drowne, was :
. . . to study the organization and administra t ion of the j uvenile
court system and the procedure followed by the several courts in
disposing of the delinquent, dependent, and neglected boys and
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girls brought before them . In addition to the actual survey work ,
school officials, county attorneys, mayors, city marshals, sheriffs, representative businessmen and others in each community
were interviewed to learn the standing and gen era l reputation of
the courts . (National Probation and Parole Association , 1929 ,
p . 5)

Each district court was investigated by the National Probation and
Parole As sociation , and recommendations were given to help each partieu lar court system .

The National Probation and Parole Association lists

the following recommendations given to District I:
1 . Preliminary investigations should be more thorough . . .
2 . Probation should be used in more cases instead of suspended sentences . . . .
3. A carefully worked out plan of treatment should be
formulated in each case, and the probation officers, through talks
with the child and visits to the home and school, should see that
satisfactory progress is made,
4. The judge of this court should take a more active interest
in supervising the work of two probation officers .
5 . In disposing of cases , orders for the payment of fines
and fo r commitment to the detention rooms should be made only
when necessary . . . .
6 , The juveni.le court should hear all cases of contributing
to the delinquency, dependency, or neglect of a juvenile that
arise within the district.
7 . The judge of this court shou ld receive a somewhat higher
salary so that he can afford to spend more of his time in the work .
(National Probation and Parole Association, 1929, p . 20)
The National Probation and Parole Association (1929 , p. ll) felt
that the shortcomings in each court were due to a lack of "knowledge as
to what constitutes good juvenile court work."
Winters (1964 -1 965) reported that this survey resulted in a complete
re vi sion of Utah ' s juvenile court laws. It was proposed and presented to
the legislature in 1931 and was enacted into law at that time. Elle tt
explained :
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This act was an attempt to conform in general with juvenile
c o urt standards fo rmu l ated by the United States Children ' s Bureau
a n d was des i gn ed to embody the best results of experience o f the
v ario u s states w ith juv enile court administration. (Ellett , 1940 1942 , p . 8)
The a c t o f 193 1, accordi ng to Winters (1964-1965), remained with
amendments until the Utah Juvenile Court Act of 1965 . Robinson e1abo rated o n the powers o f the 1931 act :
. . . extends the parental protection of the court to the point of
g iv ing it exclusi ve original jurisdiction over delinquent , dependent ,
or negle cted children ; to determine paternity, custody or guardianship , and to grant adopti ons . The act applies to all children under
the age of 18 and fo r the purpose of con tinuing treatment beyond
the eighteenth birthday the juvenile court can continue jurisdiction
over a case until the child reaches the age of 21. (Robinson,
1932d , p . 3)

Pur_2.ose of

th~uvenile

COJ,!rt in 1932

In a l e tter to the Bo ard of Commissioner s of the Utah State Bar ,
dated March 18 , 19 32, Robinson s poke of the principles behind the establishment o f the j uvenile court.
Underlying the establishment of ju venile courts in the United
States is the principle that thes e agencies are to work for the
social adjustment and correction of the anti - social child who ,
thro ugh the acts o f himself or others, is threatened with becoming
a menace to society . To accomplish this end, the juvenile courts
are generally given the widest and most complete discretionary
power to do almost any and all things which a court might do to ward restraint and c o rrection or which a parent might , but all too
often d oes not , do to provide such care , guidance, and control
as will conduce to the child's welfare and the best interests of
the state . (Robinson , 19 32 b , p. 2)
Ro bins on (l 932c) pointed out that there had been a departure, over
the past years , from criminal jurisprudence to more concern of social
causes and effects of crime . The court ' s emphasis on the individual and

24
the circumstances that led up to his cnme resulted in making more effect ive use of the soc ra l sc iences in helping the juvenile .
It is stated i n the Sta te of Utah Biennial Report of the Secretary of

the Juvenile Court and Pro bation Commissio n (1938-1940 , p . 8) : ;,The
Utah law [Qf 193I] carries into effect the fundamental conception of a j u venile co uri. as a parenta I agency , d esignated to ass ist and protect th e
delinque n t , dependent and neg lec t ed c hild. " Again f rom t h is report, it
can be found t hat , at thi s period of time, Utah wa s the first state to provide for a "satisfactory system" of reco rd keeping .

~enile

Court Commiss1qn aboli shed - - 194 1

The Biennial Report of the Secretary of Juvenile Cou rt and Probation
Department {1 940 - 194 2) states tha t in 1941 the exi sting Juvenile Court
Commission was abolished and that its powers were as s igned to the
Pubhc Welfare Commission by Chapter 67, Laws of Uta h , 1941.

This

new c o mmission had the power to create bureaus, divi sion s, and depart ments unde r it to carry out the du ties of th e commission. Winters (19641965) reports that this step was ta ken as an e conomy measure .
The juvenile court o perations were later transferred fro m the Department of Public Welfare in to a new Bureau of Services for C hildren ,
according to the State of Utah , Department of Publ ic Welfare , Fourth
Bre nnial Report {1942 - 1944).

25
Midcentury White House Conference on Children
and Youth
The Midcentury White Hous e Conference on Children and Youth,
calledbyPresidentTruman, December3-7, 1950 , atWashington, D. C. ,
h ad as its purpose :
[ TQJ consider how we can develop in children the mental,
emotional, and spiritua l qualities essential to individual happiness and to responsible citizenship and what physical, economical, and socia l conditions are deemed necessary to this
development. (State of Utah, Department of Public Welfare,
Seventh Biennial Report, 1948-1950, p . 40)
And again, from the Seventh Biennial Report (1948-1950), it is
po inted out that this conference was one of the most significant steps in
studying the needs of children .

Because o f this conference, a committee

was appointed in Utah to study the following areas of child life : the
home, the schools, the church , health services, programs of vocational
guidance and placement, recreation , protective and correctional agencies
and programs, and social service agencies and programs . The recomme ndations o f this committee , concerning improvements in the environ ment of the child , were joined w ith those recommendations of the White
House Conference.

Question of separation of powers
According to Ziegler :
The administration of the juvenile court by the Public Welfare
Commission continued fairly unquestioned until the latter part of
the 1950 ' s when a growing number of persons became increasingly
concerned about the disregard of the principal of separation of
powers between the executive and judicial branch es of government.
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The constitution of the United States and of the State of Utah es tablishes the principal of three separate but equa l departments of
of government: the legislative , the executive , and the ju dicial.
Under the 1941 legislation, the law provided " the public welfare
commission shall have general control and supervision over ju venile courts and probation officers . " It was this supervising
autho rity granted to the executive branch of government ~elfare
Departme@ to control and supervise the judicial branch [}uvenile
courif that raised great concern about the constitutionality of the
existing system . (Ziegler , 19 69 , p . 2)
Because of this controversy, a bill was prepared in 1963 (to be
discussed later) and was later to become the Utah Juvenile Court Act of
1965 .
In 1949, John Farr Larson, then director of the Bureau of Services
for Children of the State Department of Public Welfare , also raised the
question of a " violation of the constitutional principle of separation of
powers," according to W inters (1964-1965, p. 503) .
However, others did not agree with this point of view, and a con-troversy continued until 1958 when a campaign was initiated by the
juv enile court judges for freedom in their profession . Winters (19641965) reported that the 1959 Legislative Counsel studied the juvenile
courts in their relationship to the welfare department. At the same time,
a committee from the Utah State Bar made a simila r study . In May 1962 ,
a report from this committee recommended a discontinuation of welfare
control . The committee gave no charges of mismanagement to the welfare
department but said it must look to the future with this recommendation .
On the 1962 recommendations , Winters reported :
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Other recommendations were for the same "status" for juvenile courts as for district courts , for an administrative board,
probation officers attached to the court itself instead of the welfare department , strengthening of the protection of l ega l rights
of parents and children in juvenile court proceedings , and
citizens ' committees to advise the courts and aid in their public
relations. A bill to accomplish these purposes was drafted during 1962 and introduced in the 1963 legislature, where it passed
the house but was defeated in the senate . (Winters , 19 64 - 19 65,
p. 503)
To this strategy instigated by the Bar Association, the welfare department, according to Winters, responded in two ways :
1. All juvenile court judges ' terms were due to expire on
June 30. One welfare commissioner announced that there wou ld
be no recriminations because of the judges' open advocacy ITo
the bilTI, but added that "we must have loyalty in the futur~"
2 . The welfare department announced a re-organization of
the juvenile courts and an establishment of the office of administrative judge . (Winters, 1964-1965, p. 503)
These two responses were criticized by the Bar Association.
Winters (1964-1965) stated that in August 1963 the Supreme Cou rt of
Utah declared that the 1931 statute , which gave the welfare department
power to remove judges , was unco nstitutional.

In 19 6 5, the 19 63 bill

was revised, and a bill was passed in both houses without a dissenting
vote.

Tuvenile Court Act of 1965 -- Utah
Winters (1964- 1965) reported that the provisions of the Juvenile
Court Act of 1965 included selection of judges, status of judges ,
citizens advisory committees , and protection of l egal rights . It removed
the juvenile court from the control and supervision of the Department of
Public Welfare and modernized the court procedures .
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Ziegler commented on the sc ope of the 1965 Act :
The Juvenile Court Act of 1965 defines its purpose to be the
sec uring for each chi ld coming before the Juvenile Cou rt such
care , g uidance, and control, preferably in hi s own home , as will
serve hi s welfare and the be s t inte re s ts of the sta te; to preserve
and strengthen family ties whenever possible; to sec ure for any
child, who is rem oved from hi s home, the care , g uida nce , and
discipline required to assist him to develop into a responsible
citizen , to i mprove the conditions and home envi ronm e nt responsible for his delinquency; and , at th e sa me time , to protect the
com munity and its indivi dual citizens against juvenile vio lence
and juvenile lawbreaking. (Ziegle r , 1969 , p . 2-3)
Provision was made for sele ction of judges instead of appointment
by the welfare commission , according to Winters :
A five-man ex -officio commission was established to be
kno wn as the Ju venile Court Commission, consisting of the chief
justice, the state bar president, and the chairman of the welfare
commission, or their alternates, pl us the state superintendent of
public instruction and the s tat e director of public health . This
commission will no t appoint, but will nominate at least two candidates for each vacancy from which the Governor w ill make the
appointment. (Winters , 1964-1965 , p. 503)
A second provision of the Utah Juvenile Court Act of 1965 is concerned w ith the s t atus of judges . Winter s makes two statements on this
subje c t : (a) Juvenile judges will rank equally in their o wn and other's
eyes with the district judges . Esteem wa s jus t as important for t he juvenile judges as the di strict judges.

(b) Juvenile judges will receive

equal treatment with the district judges on matters of sa la ry, retirement,
physica l features, and other benefits .
A third provision was that citizens advisory committees be set up
to study Utah courts and make recommendations on court ope rations and
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delinquency control and make recommendations to the judges and assist
them in prom o ting better comm unity relation s .
The fo urth and most important provision, as relate d to this study ,
JS

that of pro tection of legal right s . Winters stated :
. . . the new Uta h act tightens up on . . . safeguards , including
limit of the length of time a child may be held in detention without a court order, a record of juvenile court hearings , especially
where deprivatio n of custody is involved and guarantee of the
right to counsel in juvenile courts and the right to court-appointed
coun se l for persons unable to employ an attorney . (Winters,
1964 - 1965, p . 503)
The above quote discussed two of the requirements set down in

Gau lt : (a) guarantee to the right of notice given to the juvenile himself
and to his parents, and (b) right to counsel, representation by counsel
in juvenile delinquency proceedings.
Ziegle r discussed further the requ irements of the 1965 Uta h Juvenile Court Law :
. . . the Juvenile Court Act of 1965 places the fo llowing statutory
limitations on n on -judicial adjustment of a case : The facts must
be admitted a nd established , and consent must be obtained from
the parent or custodian and from the child, if the child is of sufficient age and understanding. The statute further provides that
efforts t o affect a non -j udicial adjustment may not extend for a
period of more than two months without l eave of the judge of the
court who may extend the period for an additional two months.
If from the results of the preliminary inquiry, it appears
that it would be in the interest of the child or of the public for the
court to intervene in the family, then a petition is filed and the
parents and child notified to appear before the courts . . . . During any phase of the hearing , the child and his parents may be
represented by counsel. Once the court has determined that this
child is within its jurisdiction and has moved to the dispositional
phase of the hearing , the court relies heavily upon a s ocial investigation prepared by the probation department . The written report of the social investigati on, which is presented to the court,
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attempts to identify the causes of the child ' s delinquency or the
situation, which brings the child before the court as dependent
or neglected, and provides the court with a recommendation for
an appropriate way to deal with the problem . (Ziegler, 1969,
p . 7)

As can be seen in the above quote , the 196 5 Juvenile Court Act of
Utah had already provided most of the guarantees to juveniles that the
subsequent 1967 U . S . Supreme Court decision on Gault provided.

In

the first paragraph is stated, " . . . facts must be admitted and established . . . " This statement suggests, although not stated in the
exact words, that the third requirement of Gault, (c) right to confrontation and cross-examination by prosecuting witnesses, has already been
met.

For facts to be "established," testimony is needed from more than

just the juvenile.
The first paragraph of the above quote also suggests that the fourth
req u irement of Gault, (d) privilege against self-incrimination in juvenile
delinquency proceedings, has been met since the paragraph states that
the ch1ld must be " . . . of sufficient age and under standing . . . " before
he can admit to the facts in the case .
The second paragraph quoted by Ziegler fulfills the first requirement
of Gault, (a) guarantee to the right of notice given to the juvenile himself and to his parents .

The second requirement of Gault is also met in

this paragraph, (b) right to counsel, representation by counsel in juvenile
delinquency proceedings .
Thus, it can be seen that if one sentence t:a d been added to the
1965 Act to record whether o r not the juvenile was notified of his rights
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and one sentence added t o require the complainant t o be named and to be
present at the proceeding , the four requirements cf Gault , as stated above,
wou ld ha v e been completely provided fo r in the 19 65 Juv enile Court Act of
Utah .

However, the 1965 Act , as written , ha s provide d mo st of the

guarantees to juveniles that the subsequent 1967 Gault decision by the
U . S . Supreme Court prov ided .
The 1965 Utah Juvenile Court Act prov ided further guarantees to the
juvenile .

These are discussed by Ziegler as follows :

In matters where the child may be a threat to the community
or to himself or where there is a breakdown in the structure of the
family, the court may place the child on probation or under protective supervision , transfer custody from the parent to an indi v idua l or agency , commit the child to the Utah State Industrial
School or terminate all parental rights . The court has broad
discretion concerning the disposition of a case and is restricted
only by the lack of community or court resources and by the
statutory prohibition that a child cannot be committed to jail or
prison.
When a child i s placed o n probatio n or under protective
supervision , he is usually supervi s ed in his home by a probation
officer of the court. Probation is a process of helping an individua l accept and live within the limitations required by society .
The probation officer atte mpts to develo p the potentials of a child
through counseling or casework services, arranging psychiatric
assistance when needed , assisting with school curriculum problems, etc . (Zie gler, 19 69, p . 7)
When a juvenile is placed on probation in Utah , a list of conditions is given to him and t o his parents (refer to Appendix).

These

c o nditions must be obeyed by the juvenile, and th e form listing these
conditions must be signed by the child, his parents, and the probation
officer .
A Petition of Expungement (to erase) may be requested by the
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juvenile (refer to Appendix) . If the conditions indicated on the petition
have been met, then the juveni.Je court records of the c hild are c o sed for
mspection .

U . S. Supreme Court Decision on Gault
The basic rights of the juvenile appearing before a court w ere made
even more apparent in the 1967 Gault decision handed down by the
U.

s.

Supreme Court.

Good juvenile courts were already assuring their

juveniles of the rights set down by Gault.

It is the other courts that

needed to be affected by this U. S . Supreme Court decision .
four main requirements set down by Gault:

There were

(a) guarantee to the right of

notice given to the juvenile himself and to his parents; (b) right to
counsel , representation by counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings;
(c) right to confrontation and cross-examination by prosecuting witnesses;
and (d) privilege against self-incrimination in juvenile delinquency proceedings .
The Gault decision and its effect on Utah w ill be discussed at
length in Chapter III .

Words on the juvenile court movement
in Utah
In a speech given at the 1967 Idaho Annual Health Conference,
John Farr Larson, Judge of the Secon d District Juvenile Court of Utah ,
spoke on the "Role of the Juvenile Court in Juvenile Delinquency." He
spoke of the three basic elements in the operation of a juvenile court
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t o day : (a) protection of the indiv idu al ri ght s, (b) prote ction of the public ,
and (c) the court helping ea c h child reach h is pote nti a l m his role a s a
responsible citizen .

He felt the third element was the s eparat ' ng p o int

b e tween juvenile and ot h e r c ourts .
Judge Larson (1967) quoted po rtions of an addre s s g iven by former
U . S . Supreme Court Chief Ju stiCe Earl Warren . Judge Larson fel t these
to be appropriate concernin g the histo ry of the juv en ile court system in
Utah .
As you know , the dual roles of the court have g iven rise
to vexing problems in defining its function and establishing appropriate limits upon its authority.
In the early history of the c o urt, the tendency was to regard
its social welfare and ".2ar12ns patriae " functions as o f primary importance . During the past twenty-five years , ho wever , there has
been evidence of a mounting c o ncern abo ut the n e ed for th e c o urt
to pay greater attention t o s afeguarding the legal rights of the
child . As is perhaps inevitable under s uch c i rc umstances , ex tremist points of view have been espoused by parti s ans of the two
Jffiaii!J opposing c o ncept s . In one camp are thos e who maintain
that the juvenile court , as a c o urt of law , musts rround the juvenile with all the legal pro cesses which would be available to
him were he tried a s an adul t. The opposing v iew i s that the
s ocial , emotiona l, ed ucati o nal , health and econo mi c ne e d s are
paramount and the task of the court is t o meet these requirements
without concerning itself with legal niceties .
Surely, the chi.ld, wh o is the subject of a delinquency com plaint, is entitled to comparable, if n o t greater, safeguards . And
indeed the task of the juvenile court judge would be a less complicated one if his responsibility began and ended with fulfi lling
the "nice quillets of the law . " But the j uvenile court is more than
an instrument of justice; since its inception , mo re than SO years
ago, this court has been recognized as an instrument of social
policy . Hence , the juvenile court judge must give equal attention
both to the needs of the child and the adequate protect ion of
society. (Larson , 1967 , p , ll-12)
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Summary- -A h i ghlight o f Utah ' s history
The history of Utah ' s Juv enile Court system shows a pictu re of
pro gressive movement at

eeping an up- t o -date system .

Highlights of

Ur.ah ' s histo ry are as follows ;
Utah ' s early l eg is lation s tarted even before the world ' s first juvenile c ou rt was developed in 18 99 .

Utah was developing methods of

treatment fo r its j venil es as early as 1852 . In 1905 , a law was passed
permittin g large r cities t o es tabli sh j uve nile courts a s a branch of the
city court system . The 1917 legislation made it clear that ju veniles
should be separated from cr iminal s.
The National Probation and Paro le Association, in 1928 , conducted
a survey oi Utah ' s juv e nile court system which resulted in a complete re •i s10n o f the system as mstructed in t h e legislation of 1831.
The Juven ile Court Co mmi s sion , set up in 190 5, was abolished in
1941 a nd its po wers a ssigned to the Public Welfare Commission.
In 1950 , President Truman called the Midcentury White House Con fe rence o n Chil dren and Youth t o study the needs of children . A study
wa s done in Utah at this same time and recommendations made to coincide
w ith tho se of the c o nference .
A question of the separation of powers between the branches of
government wa s raised during t he 19 SO's .

Friction continued until in 19 63

the Su pre me Court of Utah declared the 1931 statute to be unconstitutional
and a fo rma l b ill pass e d to this affect in 1965 . Thi s bill removed the juvenile c ourt from th e De partment of Public Welfare and also modernized
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c o urt procedures

0

This 1965 Act provided most of the guarantees to ju-

v eniles that a subsequent U o S " Supreme Court decisio n provided o In
196 7, the basic right s of juveniles were denied a 15- year-old boy o As a
re s ult , new legi sl ation wa s ha nde d down by the Supreme Court.
the 1967 U o S o Su preme Cou rt Deci sion on Gault.

This was

This latest legislation

will be discussed at length i n the following chapter o
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CHAPTER III
GA ULT AND DUE PROCESS STANDARDS

In Re Gault , 387

u. s .

~.§22_

In 196 7 , the U . S . Supreme Court handed down a decision affecting the p rocedures in j uven: le c ourts . Thi s decision resu lted from a
denial of guarantees prov ided by the due process of law to a 15-year-old
boy in Arizona . The guarantees, which became re-established in the
framework. of juvenile c ou rt procedures, were: (a) guarantee to the right
of n ot1c e given to the juven ile himself and to his parents; (b) right to
c o unsel , r epre s entatio n by c ounsel m juvenile delinquency proceedings;
(c ) right to c o nfrontatio n and cro ss - examination by prosecuting witnesses;
and (d) privile ge against s elf-incrimination in juvenile delinquency pro ceedi ngs .
Ge o rge (1 968 b) gi ves a n excellent review of the Gault incident resulting i n co mmitment of a juvenile . On June 8, 1964 , Gerald Francis
Gault and a friend , Rona l d Lewis, were picked up by the sheriff of Gila
Co unty , Ari zona , after a complain t w as made by Mrs . Cook , a neighborhood lady .
The complamt was that Gerald and his friend had made obscene
remark s t o her over the telephone.

Gerald was , at this time , on six

mo nth ' s probatio n follow i ng an mcident in February

19 64 .

Althou gh Gera ld 's parents were at work when h e was picked up,
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no effort was made to no tify them about Gerald .

Mrs . Gault returned

home fro m wo rk at 6:00 P . M . and later l ea rned of Gerald's whereabouts
fro m the mo ther c

Ro nal d Lewi s.

The two mothers immediately went to

the detention home and were t old a hearing wo ul d be held at
three o ' clock , June 9 .
No transcri pt was kept of this hearing . Those present were :
Gerald, his mother , his older bro ther , and probation officers . Gerald's
father was out of t own wo r ing . No summons or other form of notification
was sent to him .
A petition for this hea ring wa s filed the day of the hearing, June 9,
but no c o py was g iven t o Ge ra l d 's parents . The petition informing her of
Gera l d ' s c harges was no t seen by Mrs . Gault until August 17 . The com plainant was not requ ired t o be pre sent; no record wa s made of the proceedmgs, and mfo rmatlo n on the heann g could only be obtained from a
habeas c orpus bro ught after the hear ngs were over.
Whe!1 Gerald was relea s ed from custody , June 12 , only a note informmg her of a habeas corpus hearing to begin June 15 of the fo llowing
week was signed by pro batio n officer Flagg and left for Mr s . Gault.
Mrs . Gault as k ed that the c o mpla i nant be present at t h is hearing .
Judge McGhee denied thi s request testifying that Gerald admitted to
rna ing some "l e s s o bscene remarks . " There was no other evidence
about Gerald ' s testi mony given . A referra l report was never shown to
Gerald or h is parents . At bo th the June 9th and June 15th hearings ,
neither parent rece ived a copy o f the petit ion or written notice of the
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hearing.

They also were not informed of their right to subpoena and

c ross-examine the witness.
counsel was denied.

Their right to confrontation and right to

No attempt was made to look into the history of

Gerald's past behavior.

No records exist of the delinquency charge

putting him on probation before this time.

Only a referral report of this

matter was made by the Probation Department.
At the conclusion of the June 1 Sth hearing, Judge McGhee had
Gerald committed to the state industrial training school "for the period
of his minority, unless sooner discharged by due process of law." He
was only 15 at the time, which could have meant a possible six-year
committment.
Judge McGhee based his findings on Gerald ' s being delinquent on
his past probation charge of stealing a baseball glove 'a nd also on the
boy ' s statements of admissions to making lewd phone calls.

The charge

in the final report read, "habitually involved in immoral matters . "
According to Clark (1968) , on August 3, 1964, a petition for habeas
corpus was filed in the Arizona Supreme Court.

This, in tum, ordered a

hearing by the Superior Court of Maricopa County, which was held
August 17, 1964. At this hearing, there was conflict concerning testimony given at the two earlier Gault hearings.

Judge McGhee gave

testimony such that it was vague as to what law Gerald had violated .

He

spoke on disturbing the peace , using lewd language, and "habitually being involved in immoral matters."

Because no record was available on
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the proceedings, facts had

to

be gathered from the testimonies of

Mrs . Gault , Jud ge McGhe e , and Mr. Flagg . Gerald di.d not testify at
this hearing .
Th e Superior Co urt dism1ssed the peti.tion and returne d Gerald to
the Arizo na Indu strial Schoo l . An appeal wa s then made t o the Supreme
Court of Arizona whlC h a l s o made a denial of the habe as corpus and upheld the actio n taken by the juv en ile court .
C lark pointed out that "the Supreme Court of Arizona classified the
assignments of error u nder three main h eadings :"
1 . That the Arizona Juven ile Code was unconstitutional for
failure to give notice to parents and children of specific charges,
for failure to req ui re time ly , adequate and proper notice of the
h earing , and fo r failure to provide for an appeal;
2 . That the JUVenile cou rt in fact denied G erald Gault and
hi s parents due pro c ess of law by failing to provide proper notice
of both t he deli nquency c harge a nd the hearing , for failure to
notify them o f t he ir constitu tional rights to counsel and to remain
sile nt , and by relying upon unsworn hea rsay testimony , by failing
to provide a proper record o f th e delinquency pro ceedings , and by
rem ovi ng Gerald fro m t h e custody of h is parents withou t any showing of their incompetency or inability to care for h im;
3 . A gro up o f mi s cellaneous errors dealing with the habeas
corpus hearing in Maricopa County and the o riginal detention of
Geral d . (Clark , 19 68, p . 14)

The petition wa s rejected by the Supreme Court o f Arizona on the
premise that juvenile c o urt sta tutes and code s are constitutional.
eral cases as referen ce t o t h is point were c ited .

Sev-

The court next used

the parens patri ae (role of father) doctrine which wa s t o benefit and proteet the juvenile .
When the Ga ult ca se went before the U . S. Supreme Court on
May 15, 196 7 , it wa s claimed by t he counsel for Gault that Gerald had
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been denied six fundamental constitutiona l rights.

Four of these were

confirmed : (a) guaran tee to the right of notice given to the juvenile himself and to his parents ; (b) right to counsel, representation by counsel
1n juvenile delinquency proceedings; (c) right to confrontation and crossexamination by prosecuting witnesses; and (d) privilege against selfincriminat.ion in juvenile delinquency proceedings.

Two claims, (e) the

right to a trans cript of the proceed ings , and (f) the right to appellate
review, were not confirmed .
According to Clark ,
The rationale of the Gault decision is that the impact of a
delinquency proceeding upon the juvenile is analogous to the
impa ct of a criminal proceeding upon an adult . This being so,
the juvenile is entitled to those constitutional safeguards which
would be given an adult in a criminal proceeding . (Clark , 1968,
p . 19)

~uirements

of Gault

When the Gault case was sent before the U . S. Supreme Court,
May 15, 1967, George states :
The court first reviewed the history of the juvenile court
system and its aim of protecting the juvenile against the harshness and hazards of an adult criminal proceeding . . . and noted
that the statutes consistently had been sustained as cons t itu tional on the theory that they were an exercise of the state ' s
parens ~tri ae power and that they were viewed as inherently
civil or equitable proceedings so that the normal procedural
guarantees of a cri mina l trial were inapplicable to them . De spite the aim o f the legislation and the early decisions affirming
its constitutionality, however, the court concluded that "failure
to observe the fundamental requirements of due process has resulted in instances , which might have been avoided, of unfairnes s to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of
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fact and unfo rtunate pres c ripti ons of re medy . " Due process has
returned from its extended h oliday . (George, l968b, p . 31)
Due t o this rule, sev era l re qui re ments w e re impos ed upon the court
procee dings .

No tice of charges
The firs t constitut ion a l req uirement is that there be notice of
charges given to the juvenile himself and t o his parent s. George (1968b)
points out that the notice must be in writing and must contain t h e specific
charges on which the pro ceeding is t o be based.

The notice must be

given at t he earliest pra c ticable t i me in advance to permit preparation
(five days in Utah) .
Banks and Dunba r (1968) s tated that the purpose of a notice is to
clarify the is sues in the case.
Ketcham (196 7) rai s e d the q uestio n of c onfidentiality of the notice
if it is given as sta ted in

ault.

Ketcham suggests that the parents a n d

child appear for a pre limina ry n on judicial c o nference . Then the charges
c ou ld be g iv en in privacy and a ny questions answered .
Weinstein and Goo dman (196 7) pointed out that the notice would
give the child and his parents t he opportunity t o decide wh a t action they
wished to take . Also , t hi s notice woul d help a void the possibility of
"double jeopardy," by serving as a basi s for charges be i ng hea rd an d
dismissed.
George (l968a) doubts whether, in many cases, there is co n s titutionally adequate n o ti c e . He s tated that in many ir. stances a no t ice
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i s withheld because it would b e detri mental to one ' s health or disrupt
trea tm e nt.
C arver and White (1968 , p . 65) po inted out that the Fourteenth
Admendment requires " . . . that a juvenile in state proceedings , which
could lead to his commitment , must be given notice sufficient to permit
preparation of a defense to charges . "
Carver and White also make it clear that the Supreme Court wanted
adequate notice given.

They quoted from the court decision on Gault :

Due process of law requires . . . notice which would be
deemed constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding .
It does not allow a hearing to be held in which a youth's freedom
and his parent's right to his custody are at stake without giving
them timely notice , in advance of the hearing, of the specific
issues that they must meet. (Carver and White, 1968 , p. 66-67)
Most constitutional rights can be waived , as pointed out by
George (1968b), but the waive r must be intelligently made .

This also

ho lds true for the requirement of notice.
George (l968b) includes in his book a copy of the transcript of the
Supreme Court hearing .

On page 30 o f the transcript , three requirements

to be included in the notice are given :
1 . It must state what acts are complained of.
2. It must state what statute or applicable rule of law
such acts violate .
3 . It must give some indication of the consequence of a
finding against the accused . (George, 1968b, transcript p . 30)
Also taken from the U . S . Supreme Court transcript is a quote from
a commentator named Antieau, speaking on the subject of notice :
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As of constitutional right . . . a child brought before a juvenile court is entitled to a clear statement of the nature and
cause of the proceedings against him so that he can prepare his
defense. Since many children will be unable to comprehend the
accusation, this right must, of necessity, belong also to the
child ' s parents or guardians . (George, 1968b , transcript p. 33)
Regarding notice of charges, George (1968c) also states that the
parents must receive notice so they can assist the juvenile in the matters
of procedure .

Right to counse l
The next question taken up by the Supreme Court was whether or not
the juvenile is entitled to be represented by counse l.
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice (1967) spoke extensivel y on the role counsel should play in a
juvenile court proceeding :
The commission believes that no sing le action holds more
potential for achieving procedural justice for the child in the juvenile court than provision of counsel. The presence of an independent l egal representative of the child, or of his parent, is the
keystone of the whole structure of guarantees that a minimum
system of procedural justice requires. The rights to confront one's
accusers, to cross-examine witnesses, to present evidence and
testimony of one's own, to be unaffected by prejudicial and unreliable evidence , to participate meaningfully in the dispositional
decision, to make an appea l have substantial meaning for the overwhelming majority of persons brought before the juvenile court -only
if they are provided with competent lawyers who can invoke those
rights effectively . The most informal and well-intentioned of judicial proceedings are technica l ; few adults without legal training
can influence or even understand them; ce rtainly children cannot.
Papers are drawn and charges expressed in legal language. Events
follow one another in a manner that appears arbitrary and confusing
to the uninitiated. Decisions , unexplained, appear too official to
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cha llenge . But with lawyers come records of proceedings; records
make poss ible appeals which, even if they do not occur , impart by
their possibility a healthy atmosphere of accountabil ity . (President's Commission on La w Enforcement and Admini s tration of
Justice , 196 7, p. 68)
Lockwood (1968 , p . 99), speak ing on the role of counsel , po ints
out " . . . that in addition t o the traditional ro le of representation, the
lawyer should participate meaningfully in the dispositional decision .

In

other words, the lawyer mus t truly be both advocate and counse l or." In
the role of representative, counse l must understand procedures particular
to the juvenile court, have some knowl edge of child psychology, understand methods of socia l work, and be a ble to interpret technical language
to both the parent and child .
As an advoca t e, counsel must be concerned w ith protecting his
clients' legal and constituticnal right s. If parents and child have conflicting views, it may be necessary to have separat e counsel .
George quotes from the U . S . Supreme Court Transcript :
We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that in re spect of proceedings to determine delinquency, whi ch may result in commitment to an ins titution i n
which the juvenile's freedo m is curta iled , the child and his parent
must be notified of the chil d 's right t o b e represented by counsel
retained by them or, if they are unable to afford counsel, that coun sel will be appointed t:o represent the child. (George, l968b,
transcript p . 34)
The probation officer, George (l9 68b) no tes, repres e nt s the state
not the juvenile, and the judge is an arbiter and defender .

Thus, only an

attorney can adequately represent the juvenile .
The Supreme Court, as quoted extensively by Carver and White,

45

did not agree with the state of Arizona when it denied the right of coun sel to Gerald and his parents ,
Probation officers . . . are also arresting o fficers . They
init1ate proceedings a nd file petitions . . . alleging the delinquency of the c h 'l d , and they te s tify . . . agains t the child .
. . . The probation o fficer cannot act as counsel for the child .
His role in the adjudicatory heanng . . . is as arresting officer
and witness aga inst the child , Nor can the judge represent the
child . There is no material difference in th i s respect between
adult and juvenile pr oce edi ngs . . . . A proceedi ng , where the
issue is whether the child will be found to be ·'delinquent·' and
subjected to th e los s o f his liberty for years, is comparable in
seriousness to a felony prosecution . The juvenile needs the assistance of counsei to cope with the pro blems of law , to make
skilled inquiry into the facts . to insist upon regularity of the
proceedings, and to a sc ertain whether he has a defense and to
prepare and submit it. The child requires "the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceeding against him." (Carver
and Wh1te, 1968 , p . 68)
Questi ons raised by l-.etcham (1967) on the subject of counse l are
as follows : (a) wh o is to notify the child and his parents of this right;
(b) how should t hey be g iven thi s right; (c) when should th is right be
explained, at the t ime of arrest o r later; (d ) by whom and why shou ld
this right to c o uns el be wa i'Jed; (e) what happens if no response is
given ; and (f) if c o ntradi c tion arises between parent and child, what
happens?

Right to confrontation a n d cross-examination
Gerald Gault ' s c on fe ss10n, a s pointed out by Carver and White
(1968). wa s ruled by the U. S. Supreme Court to be disregarded because

it had been obtained in v iola tion of the Fifth Amendment.

Also , the right

to confrontati on and cross -examination, which is a part o f due process.
was denied.
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According to George (1968b) , the U . S. Supreme Court felt the idea
of confrontation and eros s - examination to be central to the idea of fair
judicial proceedings . It shows the reliability of the fact-finding process
in the United States ' court system . Geo rg e quoted Wigmore as saying :
For two centuries past , the policy of the Anglo-American
System of Evidence has been to regard the necessity of testing by
cross-examination as a vital feature of the law . The belief, that
no safeguard for testing the value of human statements is com parable to that furnished by cross-examination and the conviction
that no statement (except by special exception) should be used as
testimony until it has been probed and sublimated by that test,
has found in ere a sing strength in lengthening experience. . . . [I!}
is beyond doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth . (George, l968b, p . 44-45)
The U. S . Supreme Court went on to point out that, where action
might be tak e n that would in jure an individual (such as removing his
freedom), he must have an oppo rtunity to show that the charges are untrue.
The U. S. Supreme Court ruled, according to Ketcham, that:
We now hold that, absent a valid confession , a determina tion of delinquency and an order of commitment to a state institution cannot be sustained in the absence of sworn testimony
subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination in accordance
with our law and constitutional requirement . (Ketcham, 1967,
p. 170 6)

Self-incrimination
The Gault decision decrees that the privilege against selfincrimination applies t o juvenile delinquency mattets.

According to

George, the U . S . Supreme Court rejected the idea that it had no basis
in juvenile delinquency proc eedin gs and stated the following :

•'
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It would indeed be surprising if the privilege against selfincrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to
children . The l anguage of the Fifth Amendment , applicable to
the States by the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is un equivocal and without exception. And the scope of the privl.lege
is comprehensive . (George , l968b , p . 35)
It appears that charges must be proved by means other than question-

ing the juvenile in court . Waiver of this privilege means that a "specific
warning " must be given i n the first place

o

Failu re t o speak on the part of

the juvenile will not be used against him.
The majority opinion of the U. S . Supreme Court, as stated by
George, is as follows:
In fact, evidence is accumulating that confessions by juveniles do not aid in ·' individualized treatment , " .
and that
compelling the child to answer questions , without warning or advice as to his right to remain silent, does not serve this or any
other good purpose
[I[] seems probable that , where children
are induced to confess by " paternal" urgings on the part of officials and the confession is then followed by disciplinary action,
the child ' s reaction is likely to be hostile and adverse--the chi ld
may well feel that he has b e en led or tricked into confession and
that despite his c onfession, he is being punished. (George, 1968b,
o

o

•

o

o

o

p . 36)

On the subject of interrogating juveniles, as reported by George,
the U . S . Supreme Court also concluded :
We conclude that the constitutional privilege against self incrimination is applicable to the case of juveniles as it is with
respect to adults . We appreciate that special problems may arise
with respect to waiver of the privilege by or on behalf of children
and that there may well be some differences in technique--but not
in principle--depending upon the age of the child and the presence
and competence of parents . The participation of counsel wi ll ,
of course, assist the police, juvenile courts and appellate tri bunals in administering the privilege . If counsel is not present
for some permissible reason when an admission is obtained , the
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greatest care mu s t be taken to assure that the admission was
voluntary, in the sense not only that it has not been coerced or
sugges t ed but also t hat 1t is not t h e product of ignorance of
rights or of adolescent fantasy , right or despa ir . (George ,
l968b, p . 37)

Implications of Gault and due process
in the juven ile cou rt
George (l968b) po ints out that the Gault decis ion requires jurisdiction of the juvenile court to be broken down in to its component parts .
There are three basic types of proceedings : delinquency , c hild neglect,
and child custody proceedings . Gault , as stated earli e r, is limited to
de linquen cy proceedings which c urtail a juvenile ' s freedom by resulting
in commitment t o an institution .
In the delinquency proceeding , Gault is chiefly con ce rned with the
adjudicatory stage or the decision making sta ge . This stage, according
to George,
constitutes the determination of whether the petition or other
form al proced·c:re authorized at the conclusion of the first stage is
supported by facts and whe t her tho se facts correspond to the
jurisdictional ground asserted in the plead ing. (George, l968b,
p. 43)

This adjudicatory stage ia called the second s tage of a delinquency proceeding .
George goes on to define t he other two sta ge s, although as of this
date, Gault is not concerned with t h ese.
The fi.rst stage, or the juri sdictional hearing , . . . i s the
initial determina ti on of whether a petition sho u ld be filed or a
formal pleading lodged .
This stage . . . becomes in effect the equivalent to the
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preliminary examination m states using the information system
in adult criminal cases or to the grand jury in the states adhering to the traditional mdictment system .
The third stage is the dispositional hearing . . . which
may Clppmpoa tely be conducted if at the conclusion of the
second stage the j uve n i le is adjudi.cated to be delinquent.
The right to c ounsel extends to this third stage, but it is questionable whether the other Gau lt requirements , and particularly
the right to confront witnesses, apply as well . Thi s stage is
the equivalent to the imposition of sentence in an ordinary
criminal case. (Ge orge , i968b, p . 42-44)
According to Ketcham (1967) , Justice Fortas delivered the opinion
of the U. S . Supreme Court on May I 5 , 1967.

This opinion covered

59 pages; the concurring opmions ran 21 pages, and Just1ce Stewart's
dissent wa s four additional pages .
From this writing , Ketcham (1967 , p . 1700) has summarized four
guidelines to be followed in the court : (a) the court should be a legal
proceeding from which a decision is made from the facts and evidence
given, (b) accompanying th e change to a more legal proceeding will be
a shift in discipline, (c) "[iJnstead of devoting much time to the prevention of delinquency • . . the juvenile court will be expected to concentrate upon adjudication and ordered correction," and (d) narrowing of
juvenile court jurisdiction will be· a result .
Ketcham (1967) also points out six immediate effects from the
Gault decision : (a) Past theory of parens patriae will be changed.

Con-

stitutional protections must now be granted the juvenile as well as an
adult; (b) reduction o freedom for juvenile court j udges who have, in the
past, been a

~rens

patriae or father symbol; (c) no longer will there be

"civil" juvenile court proceedings.

Now formality , regularity, and
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orderliness will be increased; (d) fatherly discretion concerning procedure in courts will be changed by having a clear understanding of due
process requirements; (e) an increase in lawyers will be needed; and
(f) communities will look at the input-output powers of their courts .
To help the increased number of cases, the President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice has suggested , according to Ketcham (1967) , that less serious cases be transferred to Youth
Services Bureaus.

To reduce intake, the commission has recommended:

(2) a reduction of the upper age limit o f juveniles within the court ' s jurisdiction; (b) the wide range of juvenile offenses to be narrowed; (c) trans ferring adult cases, such as "contributing," to an adult court; (d) the
transfer of traffic cases to a traffic court; and (e) transferring abandoned
and neglected cases to the domestic relations court.
Pro fessor Ronald Boyce at the Juvenile Rights Conference, Salt Lake
City, Uta h, also listed recommendations to be followed :
l. Regarding notice, sta tutory pleading forms in the state
code should be followed . Use facts if no pleading forms are availabl e for the offense . Notice should be served on both child and
parents, allowing at least five days exclusive of weekends and
holidays .
2. Notice should con tain advice as to right to counsel and
parties should be advised again at the hearing. The court s h ould
obtain a specific declination if counsel does not appear. The juvenile court should establish a specialized, interested roll of
attorneys, not a general calling of the bar.
3. Direct testimony from witnesses is to be preferred.
Confrontat ion and eros s - exa min ation should be allowed.
4 . No statement from the juvenile should be taken without
advice and clear waiver. There should be no comment made on
refusa l t o testify.
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5 . The court should ha ve witne sses present rather than
wait to see if the child w ill ccnte st the matter . (Boyce , 196 7,
p . 3-4)
Garff (1967 , p . 9) , at the s ame Juvenile Rights Conference, listed
three areas o f change the President ' s Co mmission on Law Enforcement
and Adm inis tration of Justice has recommende d . Acc ordin g to the report,
however, " Uta h is one of th e better courts i n the country in the terms of
the criticisms in the Commi ssion Report . " The three recommendations
listed by Ga rff are as follows :
l . Principal rehabilitative efforts should be in the community before a ssumption of jurisdiction by the juvenile court .
2 . The court ' s juri s diction should be narrowed to cases
of manifest danger to c h ild or community .
3 . Court proced ures should be infused w ith sa feguards to
ass ure fai.r and reliable determinations . (Garff , 1967, p . 9)
Larson (1967 , p . 10-l l) strongly feels that, if the juvenile court is
to fill its new role, re search must play a greater role.

" Rese arch is

sorely needed regarding the effect of the j uvenile court he arin g on the
child . " Al so, research i s needed in the areas of authority, caseload
size, types of probation officers, treatment needs, and methods in the
entire correct ional field .

Due Process

Since the Gault decision came about because due process rights
were denied Gerald, examination into these rights is warranted .

This

section will , therefore , be devot ed to a discussion of due process and
the ba sic protections offered therein .
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Bill of Rights
The Bill of Right s of 1789 refers to the first ten amendmen t s to the
Federal Constitution.

According to Neigher (1967}, they were intended to

serve as limitations on the Con gres s, the Executive , and the Judiciary
branches of the Federal Government . Only four of the ten amendments,
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth , and Eighth , are related t o criminal process.

Of

these four mentioned , only t he nfth and Sixth Amendme nts were issues in
t he Gault decision.

However, the Fourteenth Amendment must also be

discussed as it relates to the application of the entire ten amendments.
The mos t pertinent part of the Fourteenth Amendme nt to this study
is Section l which stares :
. . . no state shall make or enforce any law whic h s hall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law, or deny to any person within its
j urisdi.ction the equal prote ction o f the laws . (Commange r, 1968.
p . 147) (Italics mine.)
The "due process" clause in the Fifth Amendment was made applica ble to t h e stat es becaus e of the above Fourteenth Amendment .

Fifth Amendment
The provis io n regardin g grand jury indictments in the Fifth Amend ment h as as its purpose :
. to in s ure that persons will not be brought to tria l arbitrarily
wh en there i s no reasonable ba sis for believing they are guilty of
a crim e, and that those who are brought to trial will be adequately
informed of the charges against them . (Neigher , 1967. p. 10)
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The next clau se of the Fifth Amendment as quoted fro m Commanger (1968,
p. 146) provides " . . . that no person s hall . . . be s ubject for the sa me
offense to be tw ice put in jeopardy of life or limb . " According to
Com manger (1968 , p. 146) , the next provi sion is that " . . . no person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witnes s against himself . "
This l ast provis ion , as p o inted ou t by Neigher (1967 , p . 10) , involves
two aspect s : " (l ) The ri ght t o be free from coercion de signed to extra c t
a confession, and (2) the right to rema in silent without ha ving an inference of guilt drawn from that silence."
Due process requires that Congress not make l aws that are unreasonable or arbitrary. Also , once law s are made , they must be applied fai r ly.

Sixth Amendme nt
This am en dment is of particular importance in the Gault decision.
It reads as follows :

In all cri min al prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial , by an impartial jury of the
Sta te s and District wherein the c rime shall ha ve been committed ;
which District shall have been previously ascertained by law ,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with th e witnesses against him ; to have compu l sory
process fo r obtaining witnesses in his iavor, and to have the assis tanc e o f C ounse l for his defense. (Commanger , 1968, p. 146)
(Italics mine . )
The phrase regarding notice is more relevant t o Gault . Thus, as
stated previously, the accused must have s ufficient notice to a llow him
time to prepare a defense .
The phras e abo ve , which states the ri ght "to be c onfronted with
I
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the witnesses against him," also is relevant to the present study . As
stated by Neigher (1967 , p . ll) , "th e philosophy underlying this clause
is that the accused s hould be met by his accusers face-to-face and be
able to subject the testimony o f the w itnesses agalnst him t o crossexamination . 11
Also, in the Sixth Amendment is i ncluded the power to compell witnesses to appear for testimony.
And, finally in the Sixth Amendment is included the right to "have
the assistance for cou nse l fo r his defense."

It should be evident to the reader that the legal precedents
handed down by the Gault decision are neither numerous nor complex. At any proceeding where a child may be committed to a
state institution , that child and his parent or guardian must be
given notice in writing of the speci ic charges against the child
sufficiently in advance of the proceedings to permit adequate
preparation. The child and hi s parents or guardian must be notified of the child ' s right to be represented by counsel, and if financial considerations so require, counsel must be appointed for
them . The child and his parents or guardian must be advised of
the child ' s right to remain silent. Admi ssion or confessions ob tained from the c hild withou t the pre s ence of counsel must undergo the greatest scrutiny in order to in s ure reliability . In the
absence of a valid confesswn, no finding of "delinquency" and
no order of commitment of the child for any length of time may be
upheld unless such finding is supported by confrontation and
sworn testimony of witnesses available for cross -ex amina tion .
(Neigher , 196'7 , p . 16)

Summary o f Gauit and Due Process Stan dards

Gera ld Francis Gault wa s picked up by a sheriff in Arizona after a
complaint was made by a ne i ghboring lady.

During the course of the ju-

venUe court proceedings , Gerald was depied s ix constitutional guarantees
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of due process of law: (a) guarantee to the right of notice given to t he
juve nile himself and to hts parents; (b) right to counsel , represent a tion
by counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings ; (c) right to confrontation
and cross-examination. by prosecuting witne sses; (d) privilege aga i nst
self-incrimination in juvenile delinquen cy proceedings; (e) the right to a
transcript of the proceedings, and (f) the right to appellate review .
When the case was appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court, the first
four guarantees were upheld in the Supreme Court decision . The latter
two were not .

Therefore, the 196 7 U . S . Supreme Court decision on

Gault guaranteed the following requirements t o all j uven il es : (a) guarantee
to th e right of notice given to the juvenile himself and to h i s parents ;
(b) rig ht to counse l , representation b y counsel in juvenile delinquency
proceedings; (c ) right to confro ntation and cross - examination by pros ecuting witnesses ; and (d) priv ilege against self-incrimination in juvenile
delinquency proceedings .
The Gault decision is concerned with the adjudicatory or decision
making stage of the juvenlle delinquency proceedings.

The due process

guarantees denied to Gerald were contai n ed in the Fifth and Sixth Admendments of the Bill of Right s and a lso in the Fourteenth Amendment which
made the "due process" clause in the Fifth Amendment app licable to all
the states .
The four requirements guaranteed to j uveniles by the 1967 Gault
decision are to be used in each juvenile court of the United States . The
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primary purpose of this paper is to present evi dence c o nce rning the de gree that the req mrements o f Gault are being gua ranteed in Di s tri c t I,
Utah .

Th is evidence is pre s ented in Chapter IV.

Furth e r findings and

discussion on age , sex, race , and family backgro und of juveniles involved in the study can be found in the Appendix.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ON GAULT

In the following section, a discussion of the findings concerning
the proceedings surrounding the juvenile court hearings (in c luded in this
study) at the time of commitment will be given . These proceedings include : (a) total number of previous court appearances by the juvenile
before his commitment, (b) offenses of the juvenile resulting in commitment, (c) parent or parent substitutes present at hearing, and (d) how
summons were served .

This review is essential to the understanding of

why the juvenile was committed and to the nature of parental support the
juveniles received at the time of their court hearing .
A review of the findings of Gault will then follow . Th is review will
aid in the determination o f the extent to which the requirements of Gault
were being met during the period designated by this study.

The four re-

quirements are as follows : (a) guarantee to the right of notice given to
the juvenile himself and to his parents; (b) right to counsel, representa tion by counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings, (c) right to confrontation and cross-examination by prosecuting witnesses; and
(d) privilege against self-incrimination in juvenile court proceedings.
After these findings have been reviewed, a discussion will be offered on
each requirement of Gault . So me of the data indicated that two of the
requirements of Gault, (c) right to confrontation and cross-examination

58
by prosecuting witnesse s, and (d) privilege against self-incrimination in
juvenile court proceedings, are not be ing fully meL

In actuality , these

requirements were being met during the time of this study, and a discussion will be presented t o substantiate this conclusion.

Findings on Iuvenile Court Proceedings

Looking at the record of previous court appearances for the juvenile ,
it was found that 37.3 per cent or 22 of the juveniles had appeared in
court zero to two times previous to being committed to an institution.
However, 35.6 per cent or 21 juveniles had appeared three to five times
previously.

One-fourth or 2 5 . 4 per cent of the juveniles had appeared in

excess of six times.

Thus , a total of 36 or 61.0 per cent of the juveniles

had appeared in court in an excess of three times before being committed
to an institution . These percentages do not, of course, take into con sideration the number of warnings a child had received or the number of
times the juvenile was released without action being ta ken . As is stated
in Table l, these figures were taken from the child ' s first commitment
that fell within the period of time of this study . Many juveniles had been
committed prior to the starting time of the study, and many were recommitted after their first commitment, the commitment used in this study.
Table 2 reports the offenses for which juveniles were committed.
Exactly twice as many juveniles were committed because of behavioral
problems than for the next most frequent offense, illegal entry.

Twelve

cases or 17. 6 percent were in the illegal entry category as compared to
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Table l .

Total number of previous appearances in court before commitmenta

Number of
appearances

Number of
responses

Per cent

0 - 2

22

37.3

3 -

21

35 . 6

6 plu s

15

25 . 4

__l_

_LZ

59

100 . 0

Not recorded
Total

aAuthor used juvenile ' s first commitment that fell within the period of
July 1, 1967 -June 30 , 1969. Many juveniles had been committed previous to this, and many were re - committed .

Table 2 .

Offenses of juveniles resulting in their commitment

Offense
Assault
Automobiles
Firearms
Illegal entry
Jeopardy of self
Mischief or vandalism
Sex offenses
Theft
Behavioral problems
Misdemeanor
Felony Violations
Other a
Not recorded
Total

Number

6
0
12

ll
24
2

3
0
6sb

Per cent
4.4
8.8
0 .0
17.6
7.4
1.5
0 .0
16.2
35.3
2.9
4.4
1.5
~
100 . 0

a Parents would not accept responsibility of child.
bTotal of first column is greater than the sample of 59 cases because
some juveniles were charged with more than one offense .
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24 cases or 35 . 3 per c ent in the beha viora l c atego ry .

The behavioral

problems involved tho s e j u ve n i.l es who had run away from home . As
s tated previo u sly, it wa s not this o n e o ffense alo ne that res u lted in a
juvenile being comm i tted , bu t a c om b inatio n of problems .

On the basis

of these percentages , it would appear that behavioral problems are a
result of an unfa vorable family situation or home life, an o bservation
which is prevelant in c urrent literature . Looking at the rest of Table 2,
t hree cases or 4 . 4 per c ent we re as s ault, 3 . 8 per cent or six cases
automobile cases (stated as "depriving the owner of his auto"), 7. 4 per
cent or five cases of jeopardy o f self, 1. 5 per cent or one case mischief
or vandalism , and 2 . 9 per c ent o r two cases of mi s demeanors .

Theft

comprised 16 . 2 per cent or 11 cases . This was the third most frequent
offe nse (refer to Appe ndix) .
Of considerable interest to the study is the percentage of parents
or parent substitute s present at the hearing . Table 3 shows that in the
larg e st number of ca s e s, 4 7 . 4 per cent or 28 o f the 59 cas e s , only a
mother figure was present.

However , closely following the cases,

where onl y a mother figure was present, was 33 . 9 per cent or 20 juveniles where both parental figures were present at the court hearing.
In six cases or 10.2 per cent , only a fa ther figure was present . In
8 . 5 per cent or five o f the cases, neither parent was present .
Table 4 shows the number of juveniles present at their court hearing . Fifty- seven of the 59 children were present at the hearing fo r a
I

total of 9 6 . 6 per cent . Only two or 3 . 4 per cent were not pre sent.
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Table 3.

Parents or parent substitutes present at court hearing

Person present

Number

Father or father substitute

Per cent

6

10.2

Mother or mother substitute

28

47.4

Both of the above

20

33.9

Ne ither of the above

8 .5

Not recorded

_Q

_Q_,_Q

Total

59

100.0

Number

Per cent

57

96.6

Table 4.

Was juvenile present at hearing

Respor.se

Yes

3.4

No
Not recorded

_Q

_Q_,_Q

Total

59

100.0

Concerning the manner in which a summons was served, 96.6 per
cent or 57 summons were delivere d in person in a written statement.
Mr. Tite (1969) informed this writer that each of the natural parents must
receive a separate summons.

If separated, both parents are located and
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served .

If unknown, the summons must be printed in the newspaper four

times and a form signed by the probation officer or the one searching for
the parent stating that he has not bee n able to locate the parent.

The

parent substitute is summ oned if both natural parents are deceased
(see Table 5) .

Table 5.

How summons were served

Process

Number

1.7

Written
Verbal

Per cent

0

0.0

Delivered in writing

57

96.6

Not recorded

_l

___l_,__Z_

Total

59

100 . 0

Summary of procedures surrounding
juvenile court proceeding
A review of the findings of procedures surrounding th e juvenile
court hearing of children involved in this study was made.

The finding s

are summarized as follows : (a) The largest percentage of juveniles had
appeared before the juvenile court in excess of three times . One -fourth
of the total sample had appeared over six times; (b) Twice as many ju ven iles were committed to an institution because of "behavioral
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problems" than for any other offense ; (c) In the largest number of cases ,
only a mother figure was present at the heanng.

However, about on e-

third of the juveniles had both parental iigures present ; (d) Fifty-seve n
of the 59 children in this study were present at their court hearing ; and
(e ) In over 95 per cent of the cases, a written summons was delivered in
person to parents.

Findings of Gault Requirements

The date o f the juvenile court proceeding for each juvenile was
broken down into six-month period s.
was very close.

The number of cases in each period

Howeve r, there were more cases appearin g in court

from July of 1968 th rough December of 1968 than during any other period
of time in this study (s ee Tabl e 6).

Table 6.

Date of juvenile court proceeding

Date

Number

Per cent

J ul y 19 67 - December 1967

13

22 . 0

January 1 9 68 - June 19 68

14

23 . 7

July 1968 - December 19 68

18

30 .6

January 1969- June 1969

14

23. 7

Not recorded

_Q

__Q.,_Q_

Total

59

100 . 0
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The first requirement of Gault deals with both parents and child
being not ifi ed of their rights .

Mr . Tite (1969) pointed out to this writer

that the requirement of notifying the child of his rights would no t be
clearly reflected in the Juvenile Court records.

This o bservation appears

to be true as indicated in Table 7 .

Table 7 . Were parties advised on legal rights

Parents advised
No.
%

Response

Child advised
No.
%

Yes

53

89.8

No

0

0 .0

0

0.0

_6

~

.i1

~

59

100 . 0

59

100 . 0

Not recorded
Total

8.5

In 91.5 per cent or 54 of the cases , no record was kept as to whether or
not the child was notified of his rights.

After looking further into th is

matter, it was found that each court proceeding is tape recorded and the
tape kept on file.

If needed, one cou ld listen to the hearing to see that

the chi ld was notified of his right s by the judge in each proceeding.
This author attended a c ourt proceeding in Weber county on
July 22, 1969.

At the beginning, Judge Anderson, present District I

juvenile court judge , told the juvenile of her rights and asked both the
parents and the child if they wanted an attorney.

This right to counsel
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was waived . The forms used to record the minutes from each court pro ceeding were drawn up from the Utah Juvenile Court Act of 19 65 , and this
one requirement was not included . However , it is assumed that each
child is notified by the judge and also usually by the person taking the
child into custody . As to the parents being advised of their rights,
Table 7 shows that 89 . 8 per cent or 53 of the 59 parents were advised o f
their rights, with only 10 . 5 per cent or six of the cases not being recorded .
As stated in Chapter III of "Gault and Due Process," a child and
his parents are entitled to representation by legal counsel.

Counsel

must be assigned if either a child or his parents request it. If the family
cannot afford legal counsel , then the court must appoint a representative
for them . According to Table 8, only 2 5 . 4 per cent or 15 of the cases
were represented by a lawyer .

However, 71. 2 per cent or 42 children

and their parents waived this right.
information recorded .

On l y two cases did not have this

Regarding the re sponsibility for legal coun s el

(whether l egal counsel was appointed by the court or expense accepted
by the family), on l y one case wa s recorded as having the family accept ing the expense.

Fourteen cases or 2 3 . 7 per cent of those with legal

advice did not record the means of appointment of defense counsel.
A third requirement of Gault , right to con frontat ion and crossexamination by prosecuting witnesses, is treated in Table 9. It was not
recorded as to whether or not the complainant was present or his testimony used in 72 . 9 per cent or 43 of the cases , possibly because a
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Table 8 . Was juvenile or family represented by counsel; if no , did they
waive their right; if not waived, did court appoint counsel

Represented by
counsel
No.
%

Response

Waived right
No.
%

Court
a12120inted
No.
%

Yes

15

25.4

42

71.2

No

42

71.2

15

25.4

44

74.6

Not recorded

....1

___l_,_i

....1

___l_,_i

li

__1_U

Total

59

100 .0

59

100.0

59

100.0

Table 9.

1.7

Right to confrontation and cross-examination

Situation

Complainant present a t
hearing

Number

Per cent

16

2 7. 1

Complainant not present
but testimony used

0

0 .0

Complainant not present and
testimony not used

0

0.0

59

100 .0

Not recorded
Total

67

po lice officer will often file the complaint, and it is not recorded on the
legal transcript (see Appendix) if the police officer or the complainant is
pre s e nt during the hearing for testimony.

Usually, if a citizen files the

comp l a int , he will appear, simply because of his intere st involved . Tn
o nl y 2 7 .l per c ent or 16 of the cases was the complainant recorded as
being pres ent.

However, in none of the cases recorded, was testimony

us ed w ithout the complainant being present .
C oncerning self-incrimination, a fourth requirement of Gault,
Tabl e 10 shows that 53 or 89 . 8 per cent of the 59 juveniles admitted that
charges against them were true.

This was kept in writing on each of the

l e g al forms . Only four of the cases did not have this recorded .

Two ju-

veniles or 3 . 4 per cent did not admit to the charges brought against them,
but th e c harges were proven by testim ony from complainants .

Table 10.

Child admitted allegations to be true

Response

Yes

Number

53

Per cent

89.8

3. 4

No
No t recorded

___i

_u

Tot al

59

100 . 0
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Also concerning self-incrimination, Table 11 shows that 44.0 per
cent or 26 of the charges brought aga inst the juveniles were proven by
direct testim on y from the juvenile, while only 3 . 4 per cent or two of the
c harges were proven by means other than question ing the juvenile .

How-

ever , 27 . 1 per cent or 16 of the se cases made use o f testimony from both
the juvenile and the comp l ainant.

One-fourth or 25. 5 per cent did not

re cord how charges were proven, oth er than the child admitting to the
charges as indicate d in Tab le 10.

Table 11.

Privilege against self-incrimination in proceedings

Situation

Number

Charges proved by means other
than questioning j uvenile in
c ou rt

Per ce nt

3.4

Charge s proved by direct testima ny from juvenile

26

44 . 0

Both of above

16

2 7. 1

Not recorded

12

__1_U

59

100.0

Total

At the con clusion of each hearing, reported in thi s study, each ju venile was committed t o an institution . A total o f 96 . 6 per cent or 57 of
the 59 juveniles was committed to the Utah State Industrial School.

Two
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of the cases or 3. 4 per cent were committed to Provo Hospital for psychological testing and evaluation (s ee Table 12).

Table 12 .

Place of commitment

Institution

Number

Per cent

57

96 . 6

Utah State Industrial School
Prov o Hospita l
Other

3.4

0

0.0

Not recorded

_Q

_Q_,_Q_

Total

59

100 . 0

Summary of findings of Gault requirements
Findings on each of the four requirements of Gault, (a ) guarantee
to the right of notice given to the juvenile himself and to hi s parents;
(b) right to counsel, representation by couns el in juvenile delinquency
proceedings ; (c) right to confrontation and cross-examination; and
(d) privilege against self-incrimination in juvenile delinquency proceedings, were given in Tables 6-12.

The findings were as follows:

(a) Fifty -thre e of the 59 parents were notified of their rights .

Only five

of the children were recorded as being notified of their rights; in the
other 54 cases, this information was not recorded; (b) The largest percentage of juveniles and their families were not represented by counsel.
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Howev er, when no t repre sen ted, a ll the families waived this right. It
wa s not re corded , i n the large;, r number

0 1.

cases , who assumed the re -

sponsibil ity for counsel a}Jpo ntme t , the fa rr. dy or the court; (c) It was
not recordea, in the large st number o f c a ses, whether or not the c ompla lnant w as pre s ent at the JU Venile court prcceed ing ; (d) In almost
90 per cent of the case s, the JU Ve nile adm.' ned t he cha rges aga i nst him

w be uue ; ana (e) ln the l arge t number o f case s, i t wa ;, re orded th ar
o ffense s aga i nst the juvenile we re proven through h i s direct testi mony .
Jn 16 of the 59 cases, bo th testimony from the juvenile and the c o m·
plainant w e re used .
Table 6 reviewed the data or each juvenile c o-c rt proceeding .

The

largest nu mber of ca ses fell within the perio d o f July 1968 through
Decembe r 1968 . Table 12 names the institwtions
were committed during t he

peri·~d

to

w hich juve niles

cf this study . Fifty- seven o the

59 juveniles were committed to the Utah Sta ·e Ind us:ri a l School.

The

o ther two juvenile s were c" mmitted ro Provo Ho spital.

Discus sion

Tabl e I, t otal number of previous appearances in c ourt before
commitmen t, indicate s a large number o f JUVe niles had appeared in the
juvenile court of District I in a n exce ss of three t i me s before being committed .

Since it i s ass u med that ma n y of the juvenile s we re on proba -

tion fro m previous cou rt appearances , t he e xce ss o f juvenile c ourt
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appearances prior to their commitment seems to raise a question regarding the success of probation.

Can van on this subjects points out :

Most attempts to measure the success of probation are
limited to the percentage of children who misbehaved so thorough ly during the probation period that they were considered to
have violated probation or whose behavior was increasingly delinquent and necessitated commitment to a correctional school.
(Cavan , 1962, p. 292)
Cavan goes on to point out that there are many factors, while a

juvenile is on probation, which may contribute to future delinquent behavior.

These factors might be running with a gang, intolerable con-

ditions at home, pressure for conformity, and work experiences, to
suggest a few.
Table 2, offenses for which juvemles are committed, revealed
that "behavioral problems" were the largest category for offenses.

This

appears to ind1cate a certain amount of rebelling against the family or
conformity while belonging to a delinquent gang.

Therefore, a de scrip-

tion of offenses and the number of appearances i n court seem to correlate
with the above statement by Cavan (1962).
Table 3, parent or parent substitutes present at court hearing,
showed that in the largest number of cases only a mother figure was
present at the court hearing.

This seems to correlate with Table 16, in

Appendix, which brought out the fact the largest number of juveniles
were living with a mother figure only, at the time of commitment.
vious discussion on the importance of positive family relationships
would fit into the above mentioned correlation.

Pre-
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The 1mportance of a j uvenile be ing at his own c ourt hearing ,
Table 4 , is quite obvious ; th us, the writer feels that a d iscussion on
this point is unnecessary ,
Tite (1969), a s s tared earlie r, ind ica t e d that summons must be
served in person t o bo th parents o i the j1.:venile . It seems that District I
1s meetin g thi s requirement , according to the resdt s of 1able 5 , ho w
summa s was s erved . Almost 97 per cent o f the summons in this study
were written and delive"ed in person.
George (1968b , p . 34) stated "the U . S . Supreme Court felt that
representation by counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings is im perative ." It would appear from loc i ng at Table 7, representatio n by
counsel, that this requiremen of Gault wa s met duri ng the study , Though
the number of juv eniles be i ng represented by counse l was sma ll, there
had been a waiver of right t o coun s el by a ll parents and juv en il es not being represented by a de ense counselor.
Again from George (l 9 68 b , p . 33 , "tb.e firs t c o nstitutioo, al ma ndate
under the due process c l a u se is that there be notice of charges g iven to
the juv enile himself and t o his parents. n

Tabl e 8 , were parties advised

on legal rights , indicated that , through the data gi v en , half of the Gault
requirement was being met , that. of notifyi ng parents . Almo st 90 per cent
of the parents in th i s study were advi sed o the ir ri ghts . Looking ai
data on the c hild, this right appears to have been re v ersed . In over
90 per cent of the cases , it was not reco rded whether the child wa s
notifi ed of his ri ghts .

Ho wever , taped record ings of the hearings are
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available and indicate that the child was notified of his rights .
The Fourteenth Amendment, as pointed out by George (l968b) , contains a portion which reveals that it is important to have the complainant
present at the proceeding .

Table 9 , right to confrontation and cross-

examination , points out that in the largest number of cases , in this study ,
it was not recorded whether the complainant was at the juvenile court

proceedings .
George (l968b, p . 35) stated "since the analogy is privilege in the
adult criminal proceedings , the requirement would appear to be that the
delinquency acts charged must be proved by means other than questioning the juvenile in court." On this subject , Table 11 , privilege against
self-incrimination in proceedings , revea l s that only in a small number of
cases (18) were there means used other than just the testimony of the juvenile .

However, in 15 cases it was not recorded what means were used .
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The objectives of this study were as follows : first, to determine
to what degree the four requirements handed down by the U. S. Supreme
Court decision on Gault were being met in District I, Utah.

The infor-

mation necessary to make the determination was taken from the juvenile
court records of Distr ict L a nd only from those cases which resulted in
a commitment to an institution between July 1, 1967, and June 30, 1969.
These requirements

were ~

(a) guarantee to the right of notice given to

the juvenile himself and to his parents; (b) right to counsel, representation by counsel in juvenile de linq uency proceedings; (c) right to confrontation and cross-examination by prosecuting witn es ses; and
(d) privilege against self-incrimination in juvenile delinquency proceedings.
A second objective of this study was to see if the provisions in the
1965 Utah Juvenile Court Act, with two changes , would have fulfilled the
guarantees set down in the U. S . Supreme Court decision on Gault in
1967.
A third aim of this study was to become acquainted with the factors
of age, sex, and race of the juveniles involved in this study.
A fourth and final aim was to investigate the family background of
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the juvenile at the time of his commitment by looking at his living arrangement, the parent -ch ild or parent subsLitute-ch ld rel atio nsh i p , the
physical living condit ions o f t he JUVenile, h, s paren t 's employment ,
number of siblings, and the natura l parents ' mantal

tatus.

The la tter

two a i ms are discussed and summariz ed in the Appendix .
The sample o

59 cases wa s taken fro m the juvenile court reco rds

from Di stri ct I, Utah , which inclu des Cache, Box Elder, and Weber
cou nti es.

This was th e total number of cases resulti ng in commitment

to an institution during the period o f this study . The data for the sample
were taken from the legal and s oci al hi story records of each juvenile .
Before di scussing the above o bjectiv es , a review was made of the
j uvenile c o urt movement in the United States and in the state of Utah .

Findings

The record of prev ious c ou rt appearances , fo r the juveniles in this
study , sh o wed that over 60 pe r cent of the juvenile s had appeared before the court in an excess o f three times.

One -fou rth of the t otal sample

had appeared in exces s of s ix times .
Twice as many juveniles , 35.3 pe r cent, were committed to an in stitutio n because o f beha v ioral problems than fo r t he next most frequent
offense, illegal entry . The latter category in clu ded 17 . 6 per cent .
In nearly one-half of the ca s e s, 4 7. 4 per cent, o nly a mother or
mother-substitute was present at the cou rt hearing .

In only one - third
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of the cases, 33 . 9 per cent, were both parents present at the child ' s
hearing .
A written summo ns was dehvere d in person to parents in 96 per cent
o f the cases . If the address o f the natural parent was unk own , the summons was printed m the new spaper four time s previo us to the c o un proceeding; then a wa1ver wa s s1gned by the pro bation officer or person
s earchmg for the parent as to why he had not bee n l o cated .
The large s t number of court appearances, 30.6 per cent of the
total, was betwe en July 1968 and De cembe r 1968 .
In 89 . 8 per cent o f the c a s es, r.arenrs were advised of their legal
rights.

However, in 91 . 5 per cent o f the cases , no info rmation was re -

corded a s t o whether or not rhe child wa s not1fle d of his r i ght s . It was
found, throu gh mvestigation by this writer, that the child is advised o f
hiE righ t s at the beginnin g of the c ou rt pro c eed in g . This info rmation is
seldom recorded on the legal transcript but is ava il able on the tape recording

ept of the juvenlle court proceedin g.

Only one - fourt h of the j uveniles o r his family, 35 . 4 per ce nt , were
represented by counsel.

However, 71.2 per cen t of the amilies and ju-

venile s waived this right. This information was written on the legal
transcript o the c ourt proceeding . In 23 . 7 per cent o f the cases , no
informat'on was recorded as to whom assumed re sponsibility for appointment o f c o unsel , the court or t he fam ily.
In 72. 9 per cen t of the cases , no infonnation was recorde d as to
the c o mplainan t being present at the court pro cee di ng ,
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In 89.8 per cent of the cases , the juvenile admitted the charges
against him to be true.

This fact was recorded on the legal transcript

of the court proceeding.
In 44 per cent of the cases, charges were proved only through direct testimony from the juvenile.

In 2 7 per cent of the cases , both the

testimony from the juvenile and testimony from other persons were used.
In only 3 per cent of the cases were the charges proved only by means
other than questioning the juvenile in court.

This information was taken

from the legal record.
Fifty-seven of the 59 juveniles or 96.6 per cent were committed to
the Utah State Industrial School.

The other two juveniles were committed

to the Youth Unit of the Utah State Ho spital.

Conc lus ions

Regarding the first aim of this study, a review of the juvenile court
record, along with a first-hand inquiry regarding policy and procedures
gives indication that a major effort was made to meet the four requirements of the Gault decision in District I, Utah, between July 1, 1967,
and Jun e 30, 19 69.

However , as mentioned earlier , the record a lone

gives onl y partial support to such an impression.

Relative to this, the

following explanations should be noted : it can be readily seen by l ooking at the record of the juvenile court hearing that notic e was given to
the parent of the juvenile .

Concerning the guarantee to the juvenile to

be notified of his rights , this writer has been reliably informed that
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each juvenile court hearing is comme nced w ith the judge notifying the
c hild o f his rights , This pro cedure do es n o t , ho w e ver, appear on the
c ou rt pro ceedings reco rd .

Consequently, one would listen to the tape

recording o f eachhearing t o be as su red that th e ch!ld had, in fac t , be e n
notified o f hi s rights.
It is presently d ifficult t o d ete rrr, ne , thro ugh the juveniie c o urt re -

c o rds , whether or n o t the th i rd and fourth requirements, rig ht to co niron tation and cross-examin ati o n by pro secuting w itnesses and priv ilege
against self-incrimination in juvenile delinquency proceedings, were
f u lly being met .

The court reco rd d1d no t pro v i de o r the name o f the c o m-

pl a inant, wh ether or no t the c c mpl aina t ' s testimo ny was used to prov e
the charge s against the juv enile , o r 1f the c o mpl ainant wa s cro ss e xa mined by the defense (a right g uaranteed by the fourth req uirement) .
The second requi rement o f Gault, right to c o unsel , represent a tion
by c oun sel m JUVen il e delmquency p roceedir.gs, wa s being fully guarante ed juveniles in Di stri.ot I,

Although only 2 5 , 4 per cent o f the sample

was represented by c ounsel, 71. 2 per cent o f the sample waive d th is
right.
Thu s , the re cord o f c o urt pro ceeding s , when used as the onl y
sou rce o f in formatio n, does no t re flect the full extent to which these
Ga u lt requirements are b e ng met in D istric t I, Utah .
Regarding the seco nd a im of this study , it is further con cluded
from the di s cu s sion in Chapter II o n the 1965 Utah Juvenile Court Act
that if o ne sent ence had be en added t o t he 19 65 Act to reco rd whether
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or not the juvenile wa s notified of his rights and one sentence added
to require the compla inant to be named and to be present at the proceeding, the four requirement s of Gault would have been completely provided
for in the 1965 Utah Juvenile Court Act.
These findings are not represented to be an over-all critic a i
analysis of the juvenile court system in Utah .

Suggestions for Further Study

Further research could be directed toward identifying the feelings
of family members toward the handling of court procedures.

Did they

feel they had a fair representation? Were they adequately notified of all
rights?
Much, in the way of family background, wculd be beneficial in this
area of juvenile delinquency. A detailed social history of each case
would give better ideas as to why the juvenile is in his present situation .
Possibly, new delinquency prevention methods could be suggested.
A longitudina l study to find the effects of commitment on the behavior of the juvenile could be carried out .

Sociologists need to know

more about the effectiveness of present corrective methods.

How much

and what kind of rehabilitation occurs during the period of commitment?
As of the present date, ihe effects of Gault only are felt in the
adjudicatory hearing .

Further study to see the effects of Gault requ ire -

ments, being carried out in the jurisdictional stage or the first stage
and into the disposition al or sentencing stage , would be benefic ial .
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Also, Gault is only concerned with delinquency proceedings .

Re-

search into the possibilitie s of adding these requirements to the neglect
and child custody proceedings would be of interesL
Information needed fo r the presem study was taken only from the
juvenile court proceedings reco rds . It is a further possibility that additional study could be made on the first, third, and fot.:rt h requirements
of Gault, using the tape recordings of the JUVenile court proceed i ngs
during this same period to determine to what degree these requirements
were met on the tape recordings .
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Findings and Discussion on Sex , Race , Age , and
Family Background of Iuvenile Cases i n
District I , Utah

The sampk
Utah has a juvenile court system made up of five districts.

The

sample for this study came from District I wh1ch includes Cache , Box
Elder, and Weber counties.

All juvenile court cases, resulting in com -

mitment between July I, 1967, and June 30 , 1969 , were included in the
sample .

The sample amounted to a total of 59 cases, 19 coming from

Cache and Box Elder counties and 40 coming from Weber county.

_!)nd~

Factors of sex, race, and age .

The present study shows a much

higher percentage of boys being involved in delinquent acts.

Ma l es

comprised 76.2 per cent or 45 out of the 59 total number of cases.

Only

14 o ut of 59 cases were female , representing 23.8 per cent of th e total

sample (see Table 13 ) .
Regarding race, the sample was divided into two main groups,
white and Spanis h.

The white group included 61 . 0 per cent or 36 cases

of the tota l population .

The Spanish group consisted of 2 7. 1 per cent

or 16 of the 59 tota l cases .

The other 1 1 . 9 per cen t inc l uded 6 . 8 per

cent negro or four cases and 3 . 4 per cent or two cases listed as other
{Swiss) .

Only one case did not have race recorded , and t h is was be-

cause the social history of the juvenile was not availab le (see Tabl e 14).
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Table 13.

Sex of juveniles resulting in commitment to an institution,
July 1, 1967 , to June 30 , 1969 , in District I, Utah

Sex

Male

Number

Per cent

45

76.2

59

100 . 0

Female
Total

Table 14.

Race of juveniles in District I, Utah, committed to an in stitution

Race

Number

Per cent

White

36

61 . 0

Negro

4

6.8

Indian

0

0 .0

16

27.1

Spanish

0 .0

Oriental

l .7

Not recorded
Total

59

100 . 0
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The largest age group of juveniles involved in this study was from
14-16 years of age . This age group included 71.2 per cent of the entire
sample or 42 of the 59 cases.
17-19 year olds.
population.

The next closest age grouping was the

This age group had 20.3 per cent or 12 cases of the

Four cases or 6. 8 per cent were in the 11-13 age range,

and only one case or 1. 7 per cent was reported below the age of 10
(see Table 15).

Table 15.

Age, in years, of juveniles committed to an institution

Age

Number

10 or below

Per cent

1.7

11-13

4

6.8

14-16

42

71.2

17-19

12

20.3

Not recorded

__Q_

__2__:_Q

Total

59

100 . 0

Summary of sex, race, and age.

On the summary of the factors

of sex, race, and age of juveniles committed to an institution in
District I, Utah, from July I, 1967, to June 30, 1969, it can be seen that
the largest percentage of the samp le was comprised of males , belonging
to the white racial group, between the ages of 14 and 16.
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Family background of juveniles .
presented in the following pages .

Findings on family background are

Attention is given to living arrange-

ment of the juvenile , parent-child or parent substitute - child relationship ,
parents ' employment , number of siblings, and natural p arents' marital
status . This has been done for a better understanding of the juveniles
i nvolved in the study.
As to the juvenile ' s living arrangement , at the time of commitment ,
Table 16 shows that the largest group, 20 cases or 3 3 . 9 per cent of the
population, were living with their mother or mother substitute only . A
total of 17 cases or 28 . 8 per cent were living with natura l parents.
Seven of the 59 juveniles or l l . 8 per cent were living w ith t heir mother
and stepfather, while only one juvenile or l . 7 per cent of the study
was with his father and stepmother . A total of five cases or 8 . 5 per cent
were with adoptive parents; two cases or 3 , 4 per cent were with th eir
father or father substitute; two cases or 3 . 4 per cent were in a foster
home; and three cases or 5. l per cent were living with a re l ative .

One

male from Weber county was living by himself after being released from
the Job Corps in Ogden, Utah.
This li ving arra n gement , as stated before, was a t the ti me of th e
juvenile ' s commitment .
The relationship between the juvenile and his parent or pa ren t
substitute at the time of commitment can be summarized by referring to
Tab l e 17.

Th ere w as a total of 83.0 per cent or 49 of t he 59 cases in

which the parent - child relationship was "inadequate." The criteria for
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Table 16. Juvenile's living arrangement at the time of commitment

Arrangement

Natural parents
Ado pt1 ve parents
M o ther an stepfather
Fat her and stepmother
M o ther or mother substitute
only
father or father substitute
o nly
Foster home
Relatives
Othera
Not recorded
To tal
a

Per cent

Number

28 . 8
8.5
11.8

17

5

1.7

20

33 . 9
3. 4
3.4
5. 1
1.7

1
_l

__LZ.

59

100 . 0

Self

Table 17.

Parent- child or parent substitute - c hild relationship and
physical living c onditions at the ti me of commitment

Situation

Relations h iJ2
No.
%

Living conditwns
No .
%

6

10.2

23

38 . 9

Inadequate

49

83.0

9

15 . 3

Not recorded

__..±

~

27

~_,_§_

59

100 . 0

59

100.0

Adequate

Total
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"adequate" parent -child re latio nship were set up in Chapter I to include :
(a) consis tent discipline, (b) understandmg on the part of the parent of
the juvenile ' s problems , (c) acceptance or the JUvenile by parents ,
(d) desire by parent s to help juven ile, (e) eqLa l attention given to all
siblings , and (f) acceptance by the Juvenile of standards set by parents.
lnformation on this matter was obtained from the social history of the juvenile which was written by a pro bation offi cer assigned to work with
the juvenile .

Both the attitudes of the juvenile and of his parents were

recorded in the history.

Often a probation office r recorded that the

parents were incor.sistent or did not know how to handle matters of discipline . On the o ther hand , the juvenile , wh o could not confide in his
parents , was rebelling against incon sistent or no discipline or simply
would not live at home.
Only six of the 59 cases, 10.2 per cent , felt there was an "adequa te" relationship.

This relationship was most ofte n reported in the

cases of )uvemles living wirh relatives or in foster homes. An "inadequate" relationship , wh1ch caused a rem oval from natural parents,
resulted in juveniles living with relatives or in foster homes . Table 17,
also, represents information at the time of commitment.
Living conditions of th e juveniles at the time of commitment were
also reported in Table 17 . The largest group, 27 cases or 45 . 8 per cent,
did no t record whether the physical living conditions of the home were
"adequate" or "inadeq uate ." A total of 23 cases or 28.9 per cent of the
homes were recorded as "adeqt:aie '' wh1le 15.3 per cent or nine cases
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were recorded to b e "inadequate , " Th1s mformation w as also obtained
from the soc1al history wntren by the probauo n o ff1cer
of rhe his tories simply gave the l o catlo n or the

A large number

d ~ mens icn s

oi the home;

t herefore, n o stateme n t extsted as to whether n wa s "adequate" or
"madeqt.:ate . " Criteria fo r
s et in Chapter I ,

record~ng

"adeqeare" o r "tnadequare " w as

"Adequate " c o nd itions wo u ld inc l ude the fo l lo wi ng :

(a) adequ ate sleepir.g and li v mg quarters for the num ber of family mem bers , (b) clean liness o f house and yard , and (c) other adequate facilities
such as furniture.

"In adequate" refers to a la ck of the above conditions .

Concerning pare nts ' emp loyment , at the time of commitment ,
28 8 per cent o r 1 7 of the juve n iles were living in homes in which
neither of the paren t s o r paren t substitutes were e mp loyed , This a lon e
might appear to expla i n why housing was inadequate in 15 3 per cent of
t he cases , These famtlies , w ithout empl o yment , were on welfare .

The

largest percentage of the sam p le , 33 . 9 per cer.t or 20 cases, had the
f ather o r father s ubstl tc.t e worktng full or

part-t~ me.

In 15 . 2 per cent or

nine of the cases , bo th parents w ere working in some capacity, and
ttve cases or 8 . 5 per cent of th e JUveniles had t hei r mother or mother
substitute s wo rkin g .

Th i s informa tion wa s n o t given in cases where t h e

juveniles we re in foster homes or l 1Ving with relaLves .

Thus, 13. 6 per

cent or e i gh t. of the employment situa tions w ere not rec orded (see
Table 18) ,
The size o f the famtly , from which the juveniles c o me and the ro l e
it plays

1n

soc i a li zation , has been aiscussed by many authors .

Thus ,
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Table 18.

Parents ' employment, neither , part, or full-time, a t the time
of commitment

Employme n t

Number

Per cent

20

Father worki ng

33.9

Mother wo rking

8.5

Bot h working

15.2

Neit her working

17

28.8

59

100 . 0

Not recorded
Total

the number o f si bling s , either natural or brought in through o ther marriage , was felt to be important to this study.

The largest percentage of

the cases cam e from familie s of t hre e to five siblings .
s1sted of 33 .9 per cent or 20 of the j uveniles .
cases having mo re than five siblings .
17 case s .

This group con-

Next was the group of

This percentage was 28 . 8 or

Next was the group of cas e s coming from families of one to

two siblings . This contained 22 . 0 p er cen t or 13 cas es.

Only six of the

59 ca ses d id not have the number of siblings recorded (see Table 19).
The c h ild hood y ears are of most i mportance in the development of
an mdividua l.

The preponderance o f incomplete family settings , as

illustrated in Ta ble 20 , and marital status of the juvenile ' s natural parents at the time of his commitment may partially explain the juvenile's
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Table 19.

Juvenile's number of siblings, natural or through parental
marriage

Number
of
siblings

Response
in
number

Per cent

5.1

1-2

13

22 . 0

3-5

20

33 . 9

More

17

28 . 8

59

100 . 0

Not recorded
Total

Table 20 .

Natural parents ' marital sta tus at the time of commitment

Status

Number

Parents living together
Father deceased
Mother deceased
Both parents deceased
Divorced or separated
Living together but not married
Father deserted
Mother de sert ed
Father unknown
Mother unknown
Both unknown
Other a
Not recorded
Total
a Father deceased but never married.

17
8
3
3
19
0
4
0

Per cent

28 . 8
13 . 6
5.1
5.1
32.2
0 .0
6.8
0.0

1.7
1.7
1.7

59

1.7
___!_;2
100.0
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tendency to turn to delinquency.

Combining the two categories--parents

divo rced or separated and father deceas ed - -gives an indication of the
number cf ch1ldren in i ncomplete family settings . Almost one-third or

32 . 2 per cent of the natural parents were d ivorced or separated, and
13 . 6 per cent or e ight of the natural fathers were deceased . This number
amounted t o a total of 45 . 8 per cent of the juveniles coming from homes
where an oppo;·tunity for ideal parental identification was absent .

This

is compared w ith only 28.8 per cent or 17 of the natural parents living
together at the time of the juvenile 's commitment.

Further, there w ere

three cases or 5 .l per cent of the mothers being deceased and three cas e s
or 5 . 1 per cent of bot h parents being deceased.

Also included on the

negative side o f natural parents ' marital status are 6.8 per cent or four of
the fa t hers having deserted and I . 7 per cent or on e case where a mother
deserted .

One case wa s recorded a s having the mother and/or father

being unknown . And one male child's natural father was deceased but
had never married the natura l mother .

The figures in Tables 17 and 20

indicate a very discouraging picture of the juvenile's family background .

Discussion

Many a ut hors , includ i ng Cavan (l962). Gran (1961) , Bandura and
Walters (1959) , and Gleuck (1 952 , 1962 ) , have written on the importance
of family relationship s and juvenile delinquency.
Cavan commented on family background and juveniles committed
to an institution:
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In general, reports from training schools give little specific information abou t the families of boy s and girl s committed
to the m . Available informati on indicates that more trainmg
school children come from broken homes than is true for delinquents m general or for nondelinquent children . Even in the
smaller trai ning schools with a limited number of children , the
vanety of bro ken and incomplete h omes is very great , each
suggesting different problems in the child ' s bac kground .
(Cavan , 1962 , p. 307)
Cavan's comment appears

to

support Table 16 , living arrangements

of juveniles at the time of commitment , used m the present study . Only
17 out of the 59 juveniles were in homes with their natu ral parents.

This

was only 28 . 8 per cent of the sample . The other 81.2 per cent of the
juveniles were in broken homes .
Table 20 , natural parents ' marital status at the time of commit ment , is also supported by Cavan ' s c omment above .
of the 59 natural parents were living together .

Agam , only 17 out

This appears to show a

very low family stability setting .
Gleuck and Gleuck stated :
It i s now found that rearing by parents, whose incompatibility has been so great that it actually resulted in open breach
[flesertion, separation , and divorc~ , gave added force to the
delinquency poten tion o f . . . youngsters . (Glueck and Glueck ,
1969 , p . 122)

The abo ve statement further bac k s up the findings report ed in
Tables 17 and 20 .

The fore going infonmation indicates a seemingly ob-

vious fact; that is, favorable family relationships do no t appear to pro duce juvenile delinquency .
Ban dura and Walters, m regard to parent - child re l ationships ,
stated :
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The theory of antisocial aggression that is offered in
[iheii] book assumes that such a disorder origmates primarily
from the disruption of a chil d 's dependency relationship to
his parents . (Bandura and Walters, 1959 , p . 31)
This disruption is evident in the number of broken and unnatural
homes as indicated in Tables 16 and 20 of this study.
Cavan (1962, p . 30) goes o n to point out "when economic or occupationa1 background of parents is given , the number receiving public
assistance or who are employed or w orking at unskilled labor i s large."
Again, results from the present study seem to correlate with those
done by other authors .

Table 18 indi ca tes that approximately only one-

third of the fathers involved had some form of employment.

In another

28.8 per cent of the cases , neither parent was working.
Glueck and Glueck compared working habits of fathers of delinquent
and nondelinquent boys c
Only half as many of the fathers of the delinquent group as
of the nondelinquent could be characterized as having good work
habits . . .
At the other e xtrem e, five times the proportion of
the fathers in the delinquent group as in the nondelinquent were
generally poor workers. . . .
The extent to which the parents of the delinquents were un able to fulfill their family obligations without outside help is
further reflected in the fact that the average number of social
welfare agencies that had to step in to serve the families of the
delinquents in one way or another . .
was a figure almost
double that of the ••
number of agencies serving the families
of the nondelinquents. (Gluec k and Glueck, 1952, p . 44-45)
o

o

o

Here again, Glueck and Glueck seem to be in agreement with
Table 18.

The 1 7 families in Table 18 , in which neither parent figure was

working, were being helped by public welfare.
Cavan , in the following statement on family relationships ,
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supports the findings in Table 17.

This table indicates a high rate of

"inadequacy" in parent-child relationships .

Cavan states ;

Basically, the family carries a heavy responsibility for
the character and personality formation of every child . . . .
Many parents are unable to give their children the love and
guidance they need; many are unable to introduce their children
into the cultural mores or help them meet the social expectations of the larg er community. (Cavan , 1962 , p . 7)
The defimtion of juvenile delinquency used for this study is supported through the above statement.

In Chapter I, p. 4-5, it was stated

that a juvenile delinquent is one whose conduct becomes a menace to
himself or society .
to society.

He is a youth who cannot meet expected obligations

As Cavan pointed out in the above statement, it is the re-

sponsibility of the parent to instruct the child . The present study, as
mdicated by Tables 16 , 17 , and 20, shows an inadequacy between
parent and child which would indicate one reason why a juvenile might
not adjust to society .
The subject of Table 19 , the number of siblings in the juvenile's
fami ly , is discussed by Glueck and Glueck (1952, p. 54) who feel it is
" . . . generally supposed that delinquents stem from larger families
than do nondelinquents . " The findings in Table 19 are in agreement.
There was 62.7 per cent of the juveniles who were in families with
three or more siblings.

Of this 62 . 7 percent, 28.8 per cent of the ju-

veniles had six or more siblings .
According to Cavan (1962 , p . 28) , "boys far outnumber girls in
court appearances . . . • The ratio is consistently about four boys to
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one girl , year after year . " Table 13, sex of juveniles resulting in commitment to an institution , July 1 , 19 67, to June 30 , 1969 , in District I ,
Uta h , appears to be in accordance with Cavan's figures .

During that

period of time, there were 76 . 2 per cent or 45 males as compared to
23 . 8 per cent or 14 females .
Adolescence, age thirteen to early adulthood, is pointed out by
C avan (1962 , p . 49) as being a time when the child"

. . begins to

substitute his peer groups for his family as his most important reference
group."

From this group, his standards are set and also his attitudes

and behaviors are shaped.

This period is a time of decisions and un-

certainties for the juvenile . It seems to this writer that, if according to
our societa l standards, the child may become involved with peer groups
favoring undesirabl e behavior; the result may be tha t of delinquency.
Table 14 appears to represent a parallelism with Cavan ' s discussion on
ado l escence; that is, the largest age grouping being committed to an institution was the group falling into the 14-16 year age bracket.
It may be seen from the discussion above that rarely is any one

single factor responsible for the problem of delinquency.

Generally

there is a combination of factors that l eads to a juvenile ' s delinquent
charge (refer to Juvenile Court Referral C ia s sification Code Sheet).
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SCHEDULE
Date._ _ _ _ _ __
Place of Record _ __
(l)

ID Number-----

(2)

Sex
1 . male
2 . female
3 • not recorded

(3)

Ra ce
1. white
2 . negro
3 . Indian
4 . Spanish
5 . orienta 1
6. other
7. not recorded

(4)

Age
-10
1.
2 . 11 - 13
3. 14-1€
4 . 17 --19
5 . 20-21
6 . not recorded

(5)

(6)

Child ' s living arrangement at the time of commitment
1. natura l parents
2 . adoptive parents
3 . mot her and stepfather
4 . father and stepmother
5 . mot her or mother substitute only
6. father or father substitute only
7 . foster home
8. relatives
9 . other
10 . not recorded
Parent - child relationship at the time of commitment taken from social
history
1 . inadequate
2 . adequate
3. not recorded
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(7)

Physical living condit ions at the time of commitment taken from
social history
l
adequate
2 . inadequate
3 . not recorded
o

(8)

Vocationa l status (part or ful.ltime) of parents or parent subst it ute
1 father working
2 . mother working
3 . both working
4
neither working
5 . not recorded
0

0

(9)

Total number of siblings--full blood or through parental marriage
0
2 . l-2
3 . 3-5
4 . more
5 . not recorded
l.

(lO)

Natural parents ' marital status
1
parents living together
2 . father deceased
3 . mother deceased
4 . both parent s deceased
5 . divorced or separated
6 . living together but not married
7 . father deserted
8. mother deserted
9 . father unknown
10 . mother unknown
ll
bo th unknown
0

0

(ll)

Date of trial
l. 7/67-12/67
2 . l/68 - 6/68
3. 7/68-12/68
4 . l/69- 6/69
5 . n ot recorded

(12)

Reason for c o mmitment
l. assault
2 . car theft
3 . firearms violation
4 . illegal entry
5 . jeo pardy of self (drunkness , etc . )
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6.
7.
8.
9.

10.
11.
12 .
13.

(13)

mi schief or vandalism
sex o ffenses
theft
be haviora l problem s
mi sde meanor
felony vio la t ions (checks , e tc . )
other
not re corded

Total number of previous appearances in court

1.

0-2

2.
3.

3-5
6 plus
not recorded

4.

(14)

Parents present at hearing
l . father or father sub s titute
2 . mother or mother substitute
3. both father and mother or both father and mother substitute
4. neither
5. not recorded

(15)

Child presen t at hearing
1 . yes
2. no
3 • not recorded

(1 6)

Parents advised of legal rights
1 . yes
2. no
3 • not recorded

(17) Ch ild notifi ed of right s
1 . ye s
2. no
3 • not recorded

(18)

How summons served
1 . written
2 . ve rbal
3. de live red writt en notice
4 • not record ed

(19)

Represented by counse l
l . yes
2 . no
3 . not record ed
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(20)

Court appointed counsel
l . yes
2 . no
3 . not recorded

(21)

Waived right to counsel by bot h parents a n d child
l . yes
2. no
3 • not recorded

(22)

Right to confrontation by prosecution witnesses
l . complainant present at proc eeding
2. complainant not present at proceeding but testimony used in
case
3 . complainant not present at proceeding but testimony not used
in case
4. not recorded

(2 3)

Privilege again s t self- incrimination in proceeding
1 . charges proved by means other tha n questioning juvenile in
court
2. c harges proved by direct testimony from juvenile
3. both of the above
4 . not recorded

(24 )

Child adm i tted allegations to be true
1 . yes
2. no
3 • not recorded

(2 5)

Where committed
1 . Utah State Indus trial School
2 . Youth Unit, Utah State Hospital
3. other
4 . not recorded

Comment:

104
JUVENILE COURT .REFERRAL CLASSIFICAT ION CODE SHEET

VIOLATIONS OF LAW
ASSAULTS
OOJ Assault
002 Assa ult & Battery
003 Assault with Deadly
Weapon
009 Other (speci y)
AUTOMOBILE CASES
010 Auto Theft
0 lJ. Depriving Owner of
Vehicle
012 Illegal Entry of Ve hicle
for Theft (Car Prowl)
013 Tampering with Vehi cle
(Car Strip)
014 Gas Theft
019 Other (specify)
riRE, FIREARMS, FIRE ALARMS,
FIREWORKS
020 Arson
0 21 Fire Setting
022 Unlawful Use of Firearms
023 False Alarms
024 Fireworks
029 Other (specify}
ILLEGAL ENTRY
0 30 Burglary
0 31 Unlawful Entry to Injure,
Damage, o r Annoy
JEOPARDY OF SELF
040 Public Intoxication
041 Posses sian of Alcohol
042 Minor in Tavern
043 Possession of Tobacco
044 Wrongfully Inhaling Fu mes
045 Attempted Suicide
046 Use of Narco tics , Amphetam in es, Barbiturates, etc.
049 Other (specify)

MI SCH IEF OR VANDALISM
0 50 Des tructio n of Pro pen:y
0 51 F 'ghting
0 52 Disturbing the Peace
0 53 Riot
054 Trespass
0 55 Throwing Objects at Ve hicle
059 Other (specify}
SEX
060
0 61
0 62
063
064
0 69

OFFENSES
Rape
Illicit Sex Acts
Unnatural Sex Acts
Molest
Indecent Acts
Other (specify)

THEFT
070 Grand Larceny
0 71 Petit Larceny
0 72 Bicycle Th eft
0 73 Shoplifting
074 Receiving Stolen Property
OTHER VIOLATIONS OF LAW
FELONY TYPE
080 Ro bbery
081 Bad Checks and Fraud
082 Homicide
083 Negligent Homicide
089 Other Felony Type
M~SD:CMEANOR

090
091
092
093
094
095
096
099
097
098

TYPE
Cruelty to Animals
Curfew
Tampering with Railroads
Re sisting Arrest
Refusing to Di spe rse
Fi sh &, Game Violation
Bo ating Violation
Other (specify)
Foul and Abusive Language
G iving False Information
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BEHAVIORAL PROBLEMS
100 Out of Control (Ungov . )
101 Runaway
102 Runaway-Transient
103 Habitual Truancy
104 Truancy
10 5 Truant in Auto
106 Contempt of Court
109 Other Beha v io r or Condition
Endangering to Welfare
(specify)

ADULT CASES
350 Contributing to Delinquency
of a Mmor
351 Contributing to Neglect of
o f Child
3 52 W1lful Abuse , Neglect or
Abandcnment
3 53 Contempt of Court--Adult
359 Other (specify)

NEGLECTED OR DEPENDENT
l SO Abandoned
151 Mistreatment or Abuse
l 52 Improper Care Due to
Faults or Habit s
l 53 Improper Care- - Failure to
Provide Subsistence ,
Education, Medical Care or
Other Care
l 54 Dependent
155 Permanent Termi nation of
Parental Rights

l.

OTHER JURISDICTION - -JUVENILE
2 50 Consent for Marriage
2 51 Consent for Employment
2 52 Consent for Enlistment
2 53 Expungement of Record
2 54 Determination of Custody
on Transfer from District
Court
2 55 Change of Custody
257 Request fo r Renewal of
Custody
2 58 Request Termination
2 60 Re v iew Hearing
2 61 Probation Officer Progress
Report
ADMINISTRATIVE
300 Supervision under Interstate
Compact
30 l Supervisio n - -Other District
302 Supervision of Parolee
303 Investigation for other Agency
304 Courtesy Supervision
309 Other Administrative Case

REFERRAL SOURCE

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Law Enforcement Agency
A . County Sheriff
B. City Police
c . Highway Patrol
D. Fish & Game
E . Federal Law Officer
F . Other State Law Officer
G . Court Probation Officer
H . Other Law Enforcement
School
Family or Relatives
Public Welfare
Private Welfare
Juvenile Court
District Court
Self
Other
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Form 12
IN THE DISTRIC T JUVENILE COURT FOR

COUN1Y,

STATE OF UTAH
MI NUTES
Case No .
Name

Age (Birthdate)

Date of Hearing,_ _ _ _ __

Residence

Probation Officer _ _ _ __

Persons Present : Father Yes
No
Mother Yes
No
Child Yes
No
Father, Mother, Child._ _ _ _ _ represented by counsel Yes
No
Name of Counsel._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Parties advised of legal rights ; Yes
Waived right to Counsel Yes
No
to b e true: Yes
No

ORDER:

Date

to

come back before Court:

No
Child _ _ _ _ admits allegations
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Form 23
IN THE DISTR ICT JUVENILE COURT
FOR._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ COUN1Y, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

PROBATION ORDER
AND AGREEMENT

A person under eighteen years of age

Case No. _ _ __

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that you be placed on probation under the supervision of the Probation Department of this Court under the following
conditions:
l.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

That you do not commit further acts of delinquency;
That you attend schoo l regularly until you are 18 years of age
or graduate from senior high school or be released from attendance by the Board of Education;
That you comply with all lawful and reasonable requests of
your parents or custodian with whom you are living;
That you notify the Probation Department of any change of
your address , change of school or change of employment;
That you do not get married without the consent of your parent and the above court;
That you do not l eave the state without the consent of your
probation officer;
That you do not purchase an automobile without the consent
of your parents and probation off i cer;
That you pay restitution in the sum of $_ _ ; fine in the sum
of $___ to be paid on or before the __day of___ , 19__ ;

Dated this _ _ _day of._ _ _ _ , 19__
Judge
AGREEMENT
I HEREBY AGREE to conform to and obey the terms of my probation as
stated above and as outlined by my Probation Officer; I FURTHER AGREE
to report to my Probation Officer as directed.

Child

Parent

Probation Officer

Parent
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Rev . Form
TN THE DISTRICT J UVENILE C OURT
FORc____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ COUNTY , STATE OF UTAH
STATE Or UTAH, in the interest of
ORDER EXPUNGING RECORD
Case N o · - - - - - - - A person_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ yea rs of age
The Petition for Expungement of Record having come from this Cou rt
on the _ _ _ __:day o f - - - - - - - ' 19 ___ the Petitioner and
being present, the court having heard and examined all the
evidence adduced at the hearing finds that the Petitioner
1.

Has been terminated fro m continuing juvenile court jurisdiction
or has been uncondit i onally released from the State Industrial
School for more than one year;

2.

Has not been convicted o t a felony or a misdemeanor involving
moral turpitude since such termination of juvenile juris diction
nor are there proceedings involving such felony or misdemeanor
pending or being instituted against the Petitioner;

3 . Has been rehabili tated to the s atisfaction of th e Court .

It is therefore ORDERED that all the records in Petitioner's case in
the custody of this Court and the records of
be sealed ; except traffic matters .
That the Petitioner ' s case shall be deemed never to have occurred
and the Petitioner may properly reply accordingly upon any inquiry in the
matter.

Dated this ____.day of - - - - - - , - - - : - -- - - BY THE COURT

Judge

19 _ _
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